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ABSTRACT 
Information notice and data subject's consent are the current main 
legal safeguards of data protection and privacy rights: they reflect 
individuals' instances, such as self-determination and control over one's 
own private sphere, that have been acknowledged in many jurisdictions. 
However, the theoretic strength of these safeguards appears frustrated by 
current online practices that seem suggesting to give-up with their most 
common form of implementation: privacy notices and request for 
consent. These measures are proving to be unsuccessful in increasing 
users' awareness and in fostering a privacy protective-behaviour. As 
recent studies have shown, although people declare privacy concerns, 
their actual behaviour diverges from their statements (the "privacy 
paradox"), as they seem to increasingly disclose personal data and to not 
even read privacy notices available online; eventually, the current privacy 
notices are not effective in regulating user's data disclosure. 
Behaviourally informed approaches to regulatory problems, already 
applied to different areas of information provision and public policy, 
helped to clarify the reasons of similar peoples' behaviour that cannot be 
reduced to a simplistic "users do not care about privacy." Highlighting 
the regulatory weakness of traditional information notices, applied 
behavioural science has also demonstrated to be particularly effective in 
improving users' decision-making and attaining concrete policy 
objectives if accompanied by ad hoc design interventions to display the 
relevant, salient information. As users do not read privacy policies or act 
in contradiction with them, other strategies might be more successful in 
promoting, "nudging," privacy-protective behaviour. 
The use of innovative information notices, like salient alerts and 
nudges, seems to be a promising means of behavioural change also in the 
area of digital privacy, a possible new area of application of behavioural 
insights. 
Building on recent studies in the field ( conducted mainly in the 
U.S.), this paper considers new forms of privacy notices (like "visceral" 
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notices), as alternative or complement to current legal (technical) 
measures for data protection. For the informed consent approach (or 
"notice and choice" approach) to work, it needs to be improved with well-
designed, transparent and regulated nudging system, capable to help 
citizens in their decision-making as regards their privacy. 
Without disregarding the challenges and limitations of nudging 
strategies in public policy in general and in the privacy area in particular, 
and examining their legal grounds, the paper aims also to integrate that 
branch of legal-policy research that see "nudging" methods as an 
effective way to gently encourage safer behaviours in the citizens. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The emergence of new digital technologies and the growth of an 
information-based economy, made data protection policy a priority in the 
European Union ("EU"), as well as in other countries' agenda, in which 
the search for a balance between the safeguard of individual fundamental 
rights and other competing interests is deemed crucial for the same 
existence of a democratic society. Information Communication 
Technologies ("ICTs"), despite being a key enabler for economic 
development, may also represent a threat to fundamental rights, namely 
to privacy and data protection rights, as enshrined by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU. 1 
Safeguarding these rights plays a central role in building trust in the 
online environment. As the European Commission pointed out, building 
this trust is essential to economic development, 2 and it is a key objective 
in the Digital Agenda for Europe ("DAE"), the EU flagship initiative on 
all I CT-related activities. 3 For these reasons, the current legal framework 
1. See Charter ofFundamental Rights of the European Union 326/02, art. 7-8, 2012 O.J. 
(C 391) 2 (containing two separate articles for privacy and data protection rights). 
2. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 1, COM (2012) 11 final 
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for GDPR]. 
3. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital 
Agenda/or Europe, at 13, COM (2010) 245 final (May 19, 2010). The DAE, which includes 
more than 100 distinct actions, has as one of its goals to reinforce trust and security online. 
Action 35, in particular, aims to provide guidance in implementation of new Telecoms 
framework with regard to the protection of individuals' privacy and personal data (namely, of 
thee-privacy Directive 2002/58/EC as modified by Directive 2009/136/EC). See Action 35: 
Guidance on Implementation of Telecoms Rules and Privacy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 
25, 2010), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security/action-
35-guidance-implementation-telecoms-rules-privacy (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). Action 35 
has to be read in conjunction with Action 12 (Review of the European Data Protection Rules) 
3
Monteleone: Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent
Published by SURFACE, 2015
72 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 43: 1 
on privacy and data protection in Europe is under review;4 Directive 
95/46/EC is going to be replaced by the General Data Protection 
Regulation ("GDPR"), which aims "to build a stronger and more coherent 
data protection framework in the EU."5 
One of the main safeguards of the EU legal framework that the 
Proposal for a GDPR seeks to reinforce is represented by the fair 
information principles;6 the transparency principle and consequent 
information obligations for those who process personal data is now 
strengthened and codified in the Draft Regulation, as a reinforcement of 
individual rights protection and an instrument of user empowerment. 7 
In particular, "Article 11 introduces the obligation on controllers to 
provide transparent and easily accessible and understandable 
aimed at reviewing the current Data Protection regulatory framework "to strengthen 
individual rights and tackle emerging challenges from globalisation and new technologies." 
EUROPEAN UNION: CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS HANDBOOK: VOLUME ] 
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND REGULATIONS 64, 73 (2014). 
4. The legal framework currently applicable in the field of privacy and data protection 
is represented mainly by the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, integrated by the 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector (so called e-Privacy Directive, as modified 
by the Directive 2009/136/EC, the e-cookies Directive). See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC); Council 
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC). 
5. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 2. The regulation, will apply to public and 
private processing of personal data in most of the activities related to the former I pillar of EU 
(the community pillar, including single market, consumer protection, social policy, etc.). The 
European Commission has a parallel initiative for the data protection in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention, 
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal 
Penalties, and the Free Movement of Such Data, at 15, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
Despite the adoption of these two separate legal instruments for data protection in different 
areas, given that the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has abolished the Pillar structure, the EC is firmly 
striving to adopt a comprehensive approach on data protection. See Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection 
in the European Union, at 409, COM (2010) 609 final (Apr. 11, 2010) [hereinafter A 
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection]. 
6. See Paul De Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data Protection 
Regulation Replacing Directive 95/45/EC: A Sound System for the Protection of Individuals, 
28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130, 134 (2012). 
7. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 25 ("The principles of fair and transparent 
processing require that the data subject should be informed in particular of the existence of 
the processing operation and its purposes, how long the data will be likely stored, on the 
existence of the right of access, rectification or erasure and on the right to lodge a 
complaint."). 
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information. "8 This is particularly relevant in situations such as online 
advertising, where the proliferation of actors and the technological 
complexity of practices make it difficult for the data subject to know and 
understand if personal data relating to them are being collected, by whom 
and for what purpose.9 "Article 14 further specifies the controller's 
information obligations towards the data subject."10 
This means that according to the transparency principle of the 
European legislation, any data controller, including an Internet company 
or an Internet Service Provider, must specify the types of data collected 
and the purposes for which they may be used. 
Data processing and data flow are thus allowed under a number of 
conditions, namely the requirement of obtaining data subject's consent 
that should be free, specific and informed. 
Directly connected to the transparency principle and information 
obligations, the informed (and also free and specific) consent requirement 
represents a cornerstone of the EU data protection legislation: it grants 
the main legal ground for personal data processing ( although other legal 
basis are contemplated) 11 and it has been strengthened by the Draft 
GDPR, becoming now an explicit consent12 requirement. 
8. Id. at 8. 
9. See id. at 43 ("Personal data must be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a 
transparent manner in relation to the data subject."); id. at 47 ("I. The controller shall have 
transparent and easily accessible policies with regard to the processing of personal data and 
for the exercise of data subjects' rights. 2. The controller shall provide any information and 
any communication relating to the processing of personal data to the data subject in an 
intelligible form, using clear and plain language, adapted to the data subject, in particular for 
any information addressed specifically to a child.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 24 
(urging, in particular for children, specific protection and a clear language). 
Id. 
l 0. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8 ( emphasis added). 
11. Id. at 43-44. 
1. Processing of personal data shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one 
of the following applies: 
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for one 
or more specific purposes; 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject 
is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into 
a contract .... 
12. See id. at 42 ("'[T]he data subject's consent' means any freely given specific, 
informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to 
them being processed.") ( emphasis added). The need to examine ways to clarify and 
strengthen the consent requirement has been considered by the European Commission. See 
A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
[I]n the online environment - given the opacity of privacy policies - it is often 
more difficult for individuals to be aware of their rights and give informed 
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It is understood that consent cannot be inferred implicitly, as 
inaction should not be perceived as the indication of users' wishes, and 
that it should be evidenced by a statement or by a clear affirmative action. 
This last aspect is particularly relevant for the online environment, 13 
where user's inactivity cannot be considered as consent, but where a 
"click" might be accepted as valid consent (if all other conditions are 
met). 14 
This means that in the context of behavioural advertising ( which is 
becoming the principal business model for companies in the digital 
economy), the informed consent requirement should be obtained, for 
instance, by the third-party advertisers tracking the users, before placing 
tracking cookies on a user's computer or before accessing information 
stored on the user's computer. For the consent to be informed, the user 
should be provided with information about, for instance, the sending and 
purposes of the cookies. 15 
The choice made by the European legislation is clearly for an opt-in 
system, where an active action to consent is required ( as opposed to opt-
out system where the consent is presumed by default, with the possibility 
for the user to change it). 16 
Id. at 9. 
consent. This is even more complicated by the fact that, in some cases, it is not 
even clear what would constitute freely given, specific and informed consent to 
data processing ... 
13. In this regard, it is important to notice that European Directive 2002/58/EC, the 
distinct directive for the protection of personal data in the electronic communications sector 
(i.e., thee-Privacy Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, also requires companies 
to obtain the Internet users' consent, in particular before installing cookies, having the users 
been provided with clear and comprehensive information. See Council Directive 2002/58, 
art. 5, 2002 OJ. (L 201) 37 (EC). The relationship between the Draft General DP Regulation 
and thee-Privacy Directive still needs to be clarified, however thee-Privacy Directive does 
not seem affected by the reform (if not for technical adjustments) and it should work as lex 
specialis with respect to the General Regulation. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 
99. 
14. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 OJ. (L 201) 31 (EC) ("Consent may be given 
by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific and informed indication of the 
user's wishes, including by ticking a box when visiting an Internet website."); see also 
Opinion of the Working Parking on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data on the "Definition of Consent," at 26 (July 13, 2011), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp 187 _ en.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Opinion on the Definition of Consent]. 
15. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J (L 337) 11 (EC). According to Recital 66 of 
Directive 2009/136/EC, modifying e-Privacy Directive "methods of providing information 
and offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as possible" and that, "[w]here it is 
technically possible and effective, the user's consent to processing may be expressed by using 
the appropriate settings of a browser or other application." Id. ( emphasis added); see Opinion 
on the Definition of Consent, supra note 14, at 32. 
16. See, e.g., id. 
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Now, it must be noticed that both the current Data Protection ("DP") 
Directives and the Draft Regulation, despite establishing those 
information obligations and consent requirements, contain few 
indications on how information should be provided to the user or how the 
latter could exercise her right to object to the processing of personal data. 
The common instruments usually adopted by data controllers to be 
compliant with the law are privacy policies ( or notices). 17 
As studies conducted both in Europe 18 and outside Europe 19 have 
shown, the problem with current privacy polices is that they are not 
effective, at least not concerning the purpose of increasing users privacy 
awareness (risks and rights) nor of encouraging a more responsible data 
disclosure. These and similar studies, 20 in fact, have demonstrated that, 
although the majority of Internet users report to have concerns about 
privacy and to notice the presence of privacy notices or warning 
messages, most of them, especially young people, do not read these 
statements and keep disclosing personal data: this phenomenon is also 
called "privacy paradox." 
Current privacy notices are ignored as they are often written in a not 
clear and easy language. In brief, they are hardly ever read by users and 
- even if read - very difficult to understand. The reality offers a scenario 
characterized by a lack of understanding by users of the ways personal 
data is collected, used and disclosed, as well as of potential risks with the 
consequence that the provision of users' consent is not really informed. 
However, even when the level of clearness and completeness of 
privacy polices is satisfactory, i.e., when they fulfill the legal formal 
17. Most common privacy notices attached to a webpage are usually accessible through 
a hyperlink and made of a long statement; they are supposed to explain what information is 
collected and for what purposes, how it is used and the choices offered to the users (e.g. how 
to update personal account or to modify the default settings). Some examples, taken from 
Ryanair and Google's websites, are provided here: see, e.g., Ryanair Website Privacy 
Statement, RY AN AIR, available at http://www.ryanair.com/ie/privacy-policy/ (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015); Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, available at 
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google .com/it! /inti/ en-
GB/po licies/privacy/ google _privacy _policy_ en-GB.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
18. See, e.g., Pan-European Survey of Practices, Attitudes & Policy Preferences as 
Regard Personal Identity Data Management, JOINT RES. CTR. (2012), available at 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pagesffFS/documents/EIDSURVEY _Web_ 001.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Pan-European Survey of Practices]. 
19. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., What's it to you? A Survey of Online Privacy Concerns 
and Risks (NET Institute, Working Paper No. 06-29, 2006); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie 
Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J. L. & PoL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'v 543 
(2008). 
20. Mary Madden et al., Teen, Social Media and Privacy Report, PEW RES. CTR. (May 
21, 2013 ), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/2013/05/21 /teens-social-media-and-
privacy/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
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requirements, they fail to realize the main purpose of the law ( at least of 
the European law), that is, to foster attentive users' decision-making and 
eventually a conscious data-disclosure behaviour. 
As users do not read privacy policies or act in contradiction with 
them, other strategies might be more successful in obtaining privacy-
protective behaviour. It is not enough that privacy policies are provided 
in a place easy to find on a website, but they also should have an impact 
on users' behaviour. 
Providing simplified, standardized privacy information, although of 
some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient. Insights from 
behavioural economics have helped to understand why ( as discussed in 
the next sections). 
Finally, current privacy policies do not help users in making the best 
choices as regards to consent ( or not) to data processing. They fail to 
realize one of the objectives of DP law, i.e., to ensure that people make 
pondered decisions about their data, and, as ultimate goal, to increase 
trust in online services. Therefore, there may be a need of policy 
intervention aimed at changing users' behaviour, introducing alternative, 
more effective ways of presenting information. 
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data 
( often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in 
addressing the current "privacy paradox," as well as the gap between 
existing legal privacy safeguards and implementing tools. 
Behavioural research has not only shown that there is a significant 
relationship between the content of privacy policies and individuals' 
privacy concems/trust,21 but also that an overload of information (e.g., 
long and complex texts) is counterproductive also in the privacy field. 22 
Given that people are influenced by how information ( on products, 
services, etc.) is presented, identifying the appropriate notice content and 
design to display online privacy information should also improve users' 
decision-making in this regard, helping them in attaining a greater 
empowerment online.23 By making easier, agile and thus more effective 
the display of privacy information, in fact, users may be able to take more 
21. Kuang-Wen Wu et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Policy on Consumer Privacy 
Concern and Trust , 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEH. 889 (2012). 
22. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing 
Behaviour: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYSTEM RES. 254 (2011); Alessandro Acquisti 
& Jens Grossklags, What Can Behaviorual Economics Teach Us About Privacy, in DIGITAL 
PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2007). 
23. See generally Sebastian Deterding et al. , Designing Gamijication: Creating Gameful 
and Playful Experiences, in CHI '13 CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS 3263 (2013). 
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informed decisions regarding the usage of their personal information 
online.24 
Experiments to test users' responses (their actual behaviour) to new 
type of privacy policies started to be run mainly in the U.S.,25 while in 
Europe this aspect is still not enough explored. This paper gives briefly 
an account of the existing behavioural studies and experiments, 
including, though, the first steps undertaken by the EU in this direction: 
BREVE (Behavioural Responses to Privacy Visceral Notices), a project 
recently launched by the European Commission, aims at studying the 
impact of different, innovative online privacy notices on users' behaviour 
as regards their privacy. The aim is to encourage also in Europe the use 
of behavioural research for policy making in the field of privacy. 
In light of the above, this article is structured as follows: Part II 
briefly recalls the main findings of the current research on privacy 
policies and informed consent requirements as (ineffective) legal tools 
for privacy protection also in comparison with other information 
disclosure mechanisms (e.g., in consumer protection contexts). The 
starting point will be the analysis of the phenomenon called the "privacy 
paradox." Having learned the lessons from previous studies and 
experiments on users' practices online, Part III discusses the challenges 
and opportunities of behavioural sciences applied to public policy in 
order to better understand the relevance of behavioural aspects in the 
privacy area. The focus will be, eventually, on privacy information 
provisions and users' data disclosure behaviour, with particular emphasis 
on recent research conducted on Privacy Visceral Notices. Part IV, 
finally, provides some recommendations on how to integrate Behavioural 
Insights into privacy policy and law (hard law and/or soft law) and on 
future research. In this way, this paper seeks also to integrate that 
research strand that explores to what extent ( and at what level of 
governance) the regulatory approach could play a role in cyberspace.26 
24. Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox, 
4 Soc. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY Sci. 40, 41-45 (2013). 
25. See, e.g., Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An 
Experimental Study 1 passim (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2011) 
(experimental study on the efficacy of various techniques ofnonlinguistic notice on consumer 
privacy expectations); Yang Wang et al., A Field Trial of Privacy Nudges for Face book, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
2367 (2014) (reporting the results of an experiment conducted on U.S. students, users of 
Facebook and exposed to different privacy nudges, ranging from a "time nudge" to the 
"emotional nudge"). 
26. See generally Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Internet Law in the Era of 
Transnational Law (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 24 
(2011). 
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II. PRIVACY NOTICES AND PRIVACY PARADOX 
A. Information obligations and informed consent 
"Confidence in the Internet and its governance is a prerequisite for 
the realization of the Internet's potential as an engine for economic 
growth and innovation. . . . The [European] Commission is addressing 
these challenges, notably via the reform of the EU Data Protection 
framework. 27
The Draft GDPR, to which this reform has been assigned, 
strengthens the consent requirement and the transparency principle, as 
said in the introduction: "The controller shall have transparent and easily 
accessible policies."28 This information disclosure obligation is imposed 
by the European legislator to any data controller, 29 including Internet 
companies/ISPs: they should provide complete and accurate information 
regarding purposes, nature, conditions of online data processing and 
users' privacy rights, so that the subjects can provide an "aware" 
consent.30 
27. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Internet Policy 
and Governance: Europe's Role in Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, at 9, COM 
(2014) 72 final (Feb. 12, 2014) (EC). 
28. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47. 
29. Data controller "determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of 
personal data," as far as there purposes are legitimate. See id. at 41-42. 
30. The consent to data processing that the data subject might decide to give should refer 
also to the purposes for which personal data are processing. In the EU legislation, in fact, the 
consent is conceived as a major instrument for individuals to keep control over the processing 
(and the purposes) of their data. This also explains the relevance of the notion of free and 
specific consent as well as of 'further purposes' for which data might be processed. 
Interestingly, while the current Directive 95/46 states that data cannot be further processed in 
a way incompatible with the purposes for which they have been collected (Art 6), the Draft 
Regulation introduces a more permissible criterion. Further processing is allowed where the 
purposes are compatible with those for which the data have been collected (Art 6): i.e. in case 
of further processing, subject's consent is required only in case of incompatibility of the 
further purposes. Internet companies certainly receive advantage from this amendment, as 
they will not need to ask for consent in many ' compatible' cases. The purposes limitation 
principle has its equivalent in the North American privacy literature in the concept of 
'contextual integrity' and possibly in its regulation as one of the principles of what will be the 
first U.S. general privacy Act. See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy 
Online, 140 J. AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & Set. 32, 37 (2011); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, CONSUM ER DATA PRIVACY fN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTfNG INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 
(2012). Although it does not seem to add anything new to the European legal framework, the 
context integrity principle could be a useful, interpretive instrument also for the application 
of the EU Draft DP Regulation, e.g. defining the limits of data processing for further purposes, 
and thus, the scope of the consent, especially online. See Kristina Irion & Giacomo Luchetta, 
Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform, CEPS TASK FORCE REP. 
10
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The traditional way to fulfill this obligation online is the provision 
of privacy notices ( or policies). More precisely, privacy notices are 
statements that should help data subjects to understand how data 
controllers will use their personal data, providing them with detailed 
information about what, why and how personal data will be collected, 
processed, stored, used and in cases, disclosed. These notices should also 
provide information about the data subjects' rights (e.g., to access their 
personal data) and the security measures adopted for its safe treatment. 
The final goal would be to confer individuals with control over their 
personal data and, through this control, to allow them to decide for 
themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the disclosure of their 
data: this approach is also called "self-management privacy."31 
These privacy notices have been gradually introduced as 
implementation of mandatory regulation ( that is the rule in the EU) or 
adopted as self-regulation practices by businesses in response to privacy 
concerns (that is the rule in the U.S.).32 Criticisms to the self-regulation 
model of privacy policies, in particular in the U.S., point out the fact that 
this model has allowed a sectorial and weak approach to privacy33 all in 
favor of business interests. With a proliferation of privacy policies not 
accompanied by substantial safeguards, individual protection would have 
become more an appearance of privacy than a reality: users may believe 
they have more privacy simply because a website has a privacy policy, 34 
or they are presumed to be consenting to a website's privacy conditions 
CEPS Digital FORUM (2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/publications/online-personal-
data-processing-and-eu-data-protection-reform (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
31. Daniel Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. 
R EV. 1879, 1882 (2013). 
32. While in the EU information obligations for companies and governmental entities 
dealing with data processing stem from general privacy legislations, at both supranational and 
national level, in the U.S. sectorial regulations and a self-regulation model prevail, as a federal 
legislation is missing and a State legislation on privacy is exceptional. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE§§ 22575-79 (West 2015). For an overview on the increasing privacy concerns 
in U.S. (from 43% in the 1990 to 88% in 2003) and for a critical assessment of privacy policies 
use by companies see generally Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting 
Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. Rev. 587, 592, 624 (2007) 
(claiming that U.S. privacy policies, far from being an instrument of protection, have become 
one more adhesion contract for individuals to avoid, the enforcement of which might be 
challenged by individuals at least for "(1) a lack of assent, as many online privacy policies 
still employ browse-wrap acceptance features; and (2) unconscionability of terms"). See also 
Chris J. Hoofnagle et al. , How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes 
to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 20 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) 
( on file with the U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley Center for Law and Technology). 
33. Daniel Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357, 365-66 (2006). 
34. Haynes, supra note 32, at 610. 
11
Monteleone: Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent
Published by SURFACE, 2015
80 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.43:1 
simply because they are visiting that website and using its services. 35 
In Europe, the adoption of privacy policies derives from the 
implementation of general Data Protection principles and rules (mainly, 
fairness and information obligations). However, traditional privacy 
policies ( or notices) are criticized also in Europe as they proved to be 
insufficient to realize the purposes of data protection. Despite the 
theoretical value of privacy policies, the efficacy of current notice and 
consent mechanisms is increasingly questioned in the privacy area, 36 as 
well as in other areas, so much that someone has defined certain 
criticisms, at times excessive, "notice skepticism."37 
Traditional privacy policies tend to be written, detailed and usually 
long and highly complex texts; in online environments, they consist of 
separate texts hardly accessible or displayed in a slightly visible part of a 
website. Internet users are asked to consent to the conditions described 
in the privacy policies by ticking a "yes" box at the end of the statements; 
more often, this box is simply positioned beside a link (hyperlink), which 
refers to another page (hypertext) containing the privacy policy: clicking 
the box presumes you have read the policies. 
Users are supposed to read these texts, understand them and give 
their informed consent to the processing of their personal data along the 
lines explained in the privacy policies. Nevertheless, this assumption 
is-most of the time-flawed, as data-subjects tend to merely scroll 
down the privacy policies and rush for the tick box ( or simply tick the 
box without even following the link). 
By providing these textual information notices, however, data 
controllers comply, at least formally, with their information obligations. 
Like for other disclosure obligations (e.g., on products and services 
35. For an overview on advantages and disadvantages of privacy ("Having too much 
privacy can be as bad as having too little") see Lior J. Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory 
of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2010, 2039, 2041 (2013), who talks of distributive 
effects of privacy (it benefits some people and damaged others) and urges, also for the U.S., 
a more proactive and non-sectorial way to protect privacy. 
36. See Brendan Van Alsenoy et al., Privacy Notices Versus Informational Self-
Determination: Minding the Gap, 28 INT. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 185 (2014); Brendan 
Van Alsenoy & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy-Friendly 'Model' Privacy Policies, SECURITY 
AND PRIVACY FOR ONLINE Soc. NETWORKS (2013), available at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/453694/1 /SPI0N _ D9 .3 .5 _Privacy_ friendly_ 
model_privacy _policies.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Alessandro Mantelero, The 
Future of Consumer Data Protection in the E. U. Re-thinking the "Notice and Consent" 
Paradigm in the New Era of Predictive Analytics, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 643 
(2014). 
37. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REY. 1027, 1055-57 (2012). 
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quality as set in the Consumer Protection regulation38), in fact, the 
European data protection law does not specify the format that this 
information to be provided to the users should have39 ( or provides only 
few indications). This means that, as far as the information provision 
obligations are satisfied, i.e., the minimum of information required by 
data protection rules has been provided, the controller is free to choose 
the way to provide this information, regardless of its effectiveness. 
1. Role of privacy policies in users' data disclosure 
The role of privacy policies should be also to enable in the users a 
cautious and aware willingness to disclose personal data.40 Under an 
economic perspective, willingness to disclose personal data might be 
beneficial for companies (increasingly relying on an information-based 
business model) and, to some extent, also for the users, who might have 
personalized, higher quality services and relevant promotions. 41 It would 
be about striking a balance between obtaining advantages of targeted 
services and keeping control over their own personal data. According to 
the neoclassic economic view of privacy, individuals would "rationally" 
trade off their short term benefits (e.g., targeted services) and long terms 
costs of data disclosure ( e.g., risks of privacy invasion), being able to 
make a pondered decision. 
Some scholars have shown the relationship between the content of 
privacy policies and the users' intention to interact with websites where 
there is a requirement to provide personal data. 42 Privacy concerns seem 
to have a negative impact on the willingness to provide personal 
information, while trust seems to have a positive impact. However, if 
people see benefits of disclosure (like personalized services in e-
commerce or entertainment in social networks) as outweighing the 
concerns for privacy risks, they would be more likely to disclose. Given 
that willingness to provide personal data online is closely related to 
privacy concerns, a way to reduce these concerns would be to provide 
them with good privacy policies, i.e., with really informative policies, 
increasing users' awareness and reassuring them about possible risks:43 
the information would be able to reduce privacy concerns and to increase 
38. Consumer protection in Europe is now enshrined in the European Directive on 
Consumer Rights 2011/83/EC. See Council Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU). 
39. Some indications, however, have been offered by the Opinion on the Definition of 
Consent, supra note 14, at 26. 
40. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8, 25. 
41. Wu et al., supra note 21, at 890. 
42. Id. at 891. 
43. Id. 
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trust in websites. In other words, using privacy policies, which clearly 
inform users about how companies treat their data and which are read by 
users, according to Wu et al., would not only reduce their concerns and 
increase trust, but it would meanwhile increase users' willingness to 
disclose personal information. 44 
However, things seem more complicated than they have just been 
pictured; reducing privacy concerns through complete information is not 
enough to increase trust. Other studies have shown, in fact, that often the 
greater the privacy reassurances provided to individuals, the greater their 
reluctance to reveal personal information because the strong privacy 
reassurance primes the individuals about the sensitivity of their data. 45 
Moreover, it does not guarantee a safe digital environment for 
individuals, to whom a cautious, responsible behaviour is required 
(regardless of the duly supervisory role of regulatory authorities). Risks 
of privacy violation, illicit data practices or violations of correlated rights 
(e.g., to non-discrimination, etc.) deriving from the increasing reliance on 
Big Data became a worrying reality in the digital era. 46 Education and 
good information are certainly important but demonstrated not to 
suffice.47 Therefore, restrictive legal intervention is sometime deemed 
necessary to protect the data-subject, usually the weakest party in online 
and offline relationships. 
In the attempt to curb the risks for data protection ( and related 
concerns) arising from the massive use of digital technologies, the EU 
Draft DP Regulation not only strengthens some of the existing 
safeguards-like the information obligations for data controllers-but 
also reaffirms the principle of minimization of data collection and 
processing.48 On the one hand, personal data collection by public and 
private entities is not forbidden by the EU law, but regulated and 
structured; on the other, personal data disclosure by users is not 
44. Wu, supra note 21 . 
45. Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of 
Privacy: 30 Years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines 13 (Working Party for Info. Security 
& Privacy & Working Party on Info. Econ., Background Paper No. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
46. See, e.g., Opinion of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data on "Purpose Limitation" (Apr. 2, 2013), available at 
http://idpc.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/Opinion3_2013 .pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); Jules 
Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. 25 
(2013). 
47. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 32, at 20. 
48. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "The data should be adequate, relevant 
and limited to the minimum necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed; this 
requires in particular ensuring that the data collected are not excessive and that the period for 
which the data are stored is limited to a strict minimum." Id. ( emphasis added). 
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discouraged, yet driven to be more aware and wise. 
2. Personal data disclosure: direct and indirect 
83 
It is important to stress that personal data disclosure ( and its specular 
activity, data collection) might occur inadvertently, especially online, 
where most of people's daily activities are nowadays performed. During 
their browsing, people leave continuous traces of their behaviour, private 
lives and preferences without being asked, or without being aware. Data 
disclosure, in fact, might be direct, i.e., on a voluntary basis (like in the 
cases of filling in an online form) and indirect, as a result from other 
online activities ( web browsing, location moving, click stream, etc.). 49 
The latter kind of data disclosure/data collection may create more 
concerns as it may occur unobtrusively, out of users' control. Most of 
the time, the two kinds of data collection are also combined: data 
collected "indirectly" might be matched with data of direct disclosure, 
allowing companies or public organizations to have a complete profile of 
people. 
Wide literature exists about the several issues raised by profiling 
techniques50 and by the "hidden" collection of data, not least the fear of 
mass surveillance51 and users' manipulation. Now, the problem is that 
against this indirect disclosure, traditional privacy notices have very little 
or any effect at all. 52 
3. Data disclosure between individual autonomy and legal constraints. 
In certain cases, the individual's autonomy to choose whether or not 
to disclose their data is restricted by the law intervention, regardless of 
users' informed consent, because it is presumed not freely given, not 
genuine and therefore not valid. 53 Some privacy risks are deemed so 
49. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25. 
50. See generally PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINE PERSPECTIVES 
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). The Draft GDPR takes into account new 
scenarios, acknowledging the existing practices ofusers profiling as new business models for 
companies but also introducing specific limitations to them. 
51. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data 
Surveillance, 4 J.L. & INFO. Sci. 403 (1993); Roger Clarke, Information Technology and 
Dataveillance, 21 COMM. OF THE ACM 498 (1988). 
52. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25. 
53. The EU law intervenes to prohibit the collection and processing of special categories 
of data, even in the presence of individual's consent and when the conditions do not allow the 
individual to "freely" choose to consent. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "In 
order to ensure free consent, it should be clarified that consent does not provide a valid legal 
ground where the individual has no genuine and free choice and is subsequently not able to 
refuse or withdraw consent without detriment." Id. ( emphasis added). 
Consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data, 
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serious by the EU legislation to foresee a strong protection especially for 
weaker categories of people. 54 
This limitation to individual autonomy, especially in contractual 
context, which might appear an excess of paternalism, can be explained 
by the status of data protection and privacy as fundamental rights . 55 This 
approach has been strengthened with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in December 2009 that gave to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of7 December 2000 ("CFR") a binding force of primary law in the EU.56 
Pursuing the economic development (also) by fostering the free flow 
of personal data, the European DP law aims at the "protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data."57 Privacy and 
data protection is understood in Europe as not only an individual right, 
but also as a public interest, a conditio sine qua non for a democratic 
society, a liberty rather than a freedom: 58 essential to guarantee the right 
to self-determination, it would ensure other rights, like freedom of 
expression, enable diversity and prevent undue societal control. 59 
Id. 
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller. This is 
especially the case where the data subject is in a situation of dependence from the 
controller, among others, where personal data are processed by the employer of 
employees ' personal data in the employment context. Where the controller is a public 
authority, there would be an imbalance only in the specific data processing operations 
where the public authority can impose an obligation by virtue of its relevant public 
powers and the consent cannot be deemed as freely given, taking into account the 
interest of the data subject. 
54. See id. at 45. Article 8 sets out further conditions for the lawfulness of the processing 
of personal data of children in relation to information society services offered directly to them. 
55. On a discussion on the private law approach to personal data protection see generally 
Nadezhda Purtova, Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to 
Privacy and Waiver of Data Protection Rights, 28 NETH. Q. HUM. RTs., 179 (2010). 
56. As recalled above, the Charter contains two separate articles for privacy right and 
for data protection rights. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8, 
Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 326) 1. Moreover, article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU provides now the legal basis for any piece of legislation adopted by the EU on data 
protection. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 16, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 55. 
57. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); see also Proposal for 
GDPR, supra note 2, at 2. 
Id. 
It is time to build a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU, 
backed by strong enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across 
the internal market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal 
and practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities. 
58. See generally Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Pullet, The Right to Informational Self-
Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for 
Democracy, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 45 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009). 
59. See generally Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops, The Challenges of Ambient 
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Although many times the two statuses overlap, the concept of data subject 
or user does not coincide necessarily with that of the consumer,60 as well 
as the European DP law is not a consumer protection law.61 
Legal public intervention and supervision mechanisms in favor of 
individuals' privacy, which might take place regardless of the interested 
subject's consent to data processing, are not rare in Europe, and are aimed 
at verifying that other legal grounds ( e.g., necessity, proportionality) 
occur: this is not only to overcome the limitations of a merely self-
regulating approach to privacy, 62 but also to guarantee the same existence 
of democratic processes. 63 
This public intervention, foreseen by the sui generis EU Data 
Protection law64 to protect the individual's rights, may occur to limit 
market practices that might jeopardize individuals' rights. The regulatory 
intervention may take place by imposing information disclosure 
requirements to companies that collect data, as well as conditions and 
limitations to the validity of a subject's consent (presumed not valid in 
cases of children or in cases of unbalanced decisional powers in the 
employment area).65 It is also reflected in the decisional, monitoring and 
Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era, 73 MOD. L. REV. 428 (20 I 0). 
60. For considerations on the consequences of this approach on the legal nature of data 
subject consent, as unilateral act, like an authorization rather than as a contractual agreement, 
see Daniel Le Metayer & Shara Monteleone, Automated Consent Through Privacy Agents: 
Legal Requirements and Technical Architecture, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 136, 138 
(2008). The issue, however, is debated in literature, reflecting two different approaches to 
Data Protection mainly embraced in EU the first, mostly followed in U.S., the second. 
61 . See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 21-22. This Report also stresses the 
difference between DP and consumer protection, which refers to a cross-cutting EU policy 
field that aims at enhancing the positions of consumers of product and services; however, 
according to Irion & Luchetta (CEPS)'s Report, consumer protection regulation when 
modifies contract law to the benefit of the consumer ( e.g. regarding unfair terms and practices) 
would depart from the party autonomy principle, while DP framework would strongly 
emphasizes the control and autonomy of individual through the instrument of consent. 
Although I fully share the view of consent as enabling individual to control over her data, I 
would stress the idea that the European DP regulation contains as much limitations to 
individual autonomy, deemed necessary for protecting a fundamental right like data 
protection that is also an essential public interest. First because the consent does not legitimize 
every type of data processing and also because the interest of data subject is at the center of 
the European legal framework ( even more in the ongoing reform) so much that the protection 
of his data and private sphere may be acknowledged and granted despite his consent to data 
collection and regardless of whether he issued a complaint or not. See generally Le Metayer 
& Monteleone, supra note 60. 
62. Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 33, at 385. 
63. See, e.g., Rouvroy & Poullet, supra note 58; Julie E. Cohen, Privacy and 
Technology: What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013). 
64. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 22. 
65. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, 43-45. 
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sanctioning powers granted by the EU law to DP national authorities. 66 
The latter could intervene, even ex officio (i.e., without a formal claim by 
the interested subject) to adopt the needed legal measures, aimed at 
preventing, forbidding data processing detrimental for individual rights 
or remedying its consequences. 67 
This rights-based approach is also reflected in the recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")68 and seems confirmed by the 
Draft GDPR; conditions and bans on the use of personal data have been 
strengthened, at the risk of being considered paternalistic. However, a 
defensive approach to data protection and privacy rights does not need to 
be also too rigidly paternalistic. 
As discussed below, a different, "soft" perspective seems possible, 
as well as an evolving interpretation of the DP rules, which, backed by 
an integrated system of alternative regulatory mechanisms, namely 
appropriate nudging strategies, would allow data protection while 
preserving the individual autonomy. 
4. Limitations of the current safeguards: the privacy paradox 
Given the relevance of informed consent for data protection, one 
could expect that it suffices to strengthen these information obligations 
and foster the provision of privacy policies to enable users to give a 
meaningful, informed consent. 69 
The proposed GDPR reinforced this concept; however, the reality 
has shown that this still valuable mechanism is not working well in 
practice, especially in the digital world. 
One of the main criticisms to the informed consent requirement 
relates to the weakness of the link between information about data 
processing and consent and to the incapacity of consent to provide 
66. Id. at77-78. 
67. See id. at 77-80. 
68. As examples of application of this rights-based approach see Case C-275/06, 
Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de Espana S.A.U., 2008 E.C.R. 
1-00271 (Jan. 29, 2008); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended S.A. v. Societe beige des auteurs, 
compsiteurs et editeurs S.C.R.L. (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959 (Nov. 24, 2011); Case C-
131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014). 
69. Although strictly connected, information obligations and informed consent are 
separate concepts and requirements. Transparency principle (and consequent information 
obligations) apply also in case of derogations from the consent requirements. This is 
particularly relevant in all those cases in which it might be impossible to systematically collect 
users' consent, but that still require the fulfilment of transparency principle about how data 
are processed. See Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the 
Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 41 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012). 
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effective control to users over their data. 70 
While Internet users usually declare to be worried about online 
privacy risks and to be aware of their privacy rights, in fact, the analysis 
of their online behaviour and attitudes, in terms of personal data 
disclosure, seems to suggest that they do not care about privacy. From 
the Special Eurobarometer 359/2011 of the European Commission 
("EB"),71 emerges that the majority of Internet users report to read these 
privacy notices when joining a social network or registering for a service 
online. 72 However, most users' online behaviour shows that they do not 
act according to their statements, as they do not read the privacy policies 
entirely or they find it difficult to obtain information about a website's 
data practices. 73 A large number of people are, nevertheless, concerned 
that their personal data held by companies may be used for a purpose 
other than that for which it was collected. 74 Similar surveys 75 seem to 
confirm this attitude. 76 
In sum, even when people declare to be worried about their privacy, 
they do not read privacy policies and do not stop disclosing their data, 
and even when people declare to read these notices they do not seem to 
reduce privacy concerns. This phenomenon is also called as "the privacy 
paradox"77 and has led to questioning the adequacy of the current privacy 
and data protection mechanisms. The idea that people do not care about 
their privacy, however, appears too simplistic in light of the most recent 
research and it has been discarded by most privacy scholars. 78 
70. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 48. 
71. See Report of the Directorate-General of Justice, Information Society & Media and 
Joint Research Centre on Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the 
European Union, at 137 (June 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public _ opinion/archives/ebs/ebs _ 359 _ en.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) 
[hereinafter Attitudes on Data Protection]. 
72. Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 1. 
73. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 17-18. 
74. Id. at 1. 
75. See Lee Raine, Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Coming and Going on Facebook, 
PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Feb. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media/ /Files/Reports/2013/PIP _ Coming_ and _going_ on_ face 
book.pdf (last visited Dec/ 18, 2015). For a user survey in mobile context (e.g., about the 
consent provision in the use of Apps by young students) see generally Yue Liu, User Control 
of Personal Information Concerning Mobile-app: Notice and Consent?, 30 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REV. 521 (2014). 
76. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 254. See also Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3. 
77. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 16, 47, reporting and 
building upon the European Commission's discussion of the Special Euro barometer 
359/2011. See Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union, 
supra note 71, at 112-15. 
78. See, e.g., Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3-4; Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick, 
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Studies have shown that the reasons for the limitations of informed 
consent and privacy notices should be ascribed, first of all, to the lack of 
sufficient information for the users to make a pondered decision about 
data disclosure, that is, an accurate cost-benefit analysis. 79 This is also 
called information asymmetry between users ( they are unaware or they 
do not have enough information on what happens with their data) and 
data controllers ( companies or governmental entities that collect and 
process users' data).80 This knowledge asymmetry suffered by users 
about further use of data is particularly sharpened on the Internet, where 
it is easier to collect data and where "Big Data is poised to reshape the 
way we live, work and think."81 The characteristics of Big Data as new 
technological trend and the entities capable to handle the power of 
knowledge deriving from it are unknown to most of people, who often do 
not have ( or see) alternatives to consent to their data collection. In the 
mobile context, then, the lack of meaningful choice to consent to the use 
of Apps is even more evident when someone talks about the subject's 
consent as "blind consent."82 
Regulators tried to cope with this asymmetry, imposing stricter 
information requirements to data controllers before ( or contextually to) 
the collection of data as transparency mechanisms (like privacy notices). 
Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens' Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies 1-29 (Sept. 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1925128 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); 
Norberto Andrade & Shara Monteleone, Digital Natives and the Metamorphosis of the 
European Information Society. The Emerging Behavioral Trends Regarding Privacy and 
Their Legal Implications, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 119, 120 (Serge 
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2013). 
79. Acquisti, supra note 45. 
80. See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Consent to Behavioural Targeting in 
European Law - What are the Policy Implications of Insights from Behavioural Economics? 
3 (July 27, 2013) (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2013-43), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2300969 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015), 
who stresses that users do not know how their data will be treated and even if they knew, they 
ignore the consequences of future data use. As he notices, this information asymmetry (and 
in particular the lack of knowledge about the economic 'value' of own data) would be also 
the reason why consent within Data Protection regime cannot be considered only under the 
economic perspective, as a trade-off between 'two parties', an exchange of free service v. 
personal data. Another reason, however, may be seen in the legal significance of data 
protection as a public interest in a democratic society, from which a different consideration 
of consent would stem: its nature would be seen as authorization (like an administrative act) 
rather than as a contractual agreement). See Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60, at 
137. 
81. Kennet N. Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (May 2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/l39l04/kenneth-
neil-cukier-and-viktor-mayer-schoenberger/the-rise-of-big-data (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
82. Liu, supra note 75. 
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The assumption is that if users receive appropriate and clear information, 
they will be able to take a pondered decision about consenting or not to 
their data processing by, for instance, a website or Social Network: this 
may include the installation of cookies on one's own device. 83 
However, even if complete and detailed information is provided by 
data controllers, 84 studies have proved that current privacy notices are not 
effective: they fail to help data subjects in their decision-making and 
consequent behaviour as regards to their data disclosure. Traditional 
privacy policies are "hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support 
rational decision-making."85 
Information asymmetries seem difficult to solve, as people are 
discouraged to read privacy polices ( and thus interpret them in their 
favor): transactional costs (namely the time needed for users to read and 
interpret them, in case complete information is provided) would make 
this information asymmetry even more difficult to overcome. 86 In 
addition, users have to face increasing uncertainty in online environments 
due to new technological capabilities of tracking systems, with 
information being gathered in different ways and by new actors: lacking 
common standards, privacy policies change frequently ( though not 
always clearly) in order to include these upgrades, making the task of 
keeping abreast with the recent version even more difficult for users. 87 
Some scholars go even further, claiming that even well-informed 
and rational individuals could not appropriately self-manage their privacy 
due to several structural problems: a) there would be too many entities 
collecting and using personal data to make the self-management system 
(i.e., consent) feasible and b) many privacy harms would be the result of 
83. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC) as modified by Council 
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC) (cookies Directive). For a recent overview on 
functional and not functional cookies, see Joasia Luzak, Privacy Notice for Dummies? 
Towards European Guidelines on How to Give "Clear and Comprehensive Information" on 
the Cookies' Use in Order to Protect the Internet Users' Right to Online Privacy, 37 J. 
CONSUMER POL'Y 547, 547-49 (2014). 
84. That is assuming companies' fairness in providing true information. Whether 
companies are not faithful to their privacy policies is, rather, an accountability issue, a matter 
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it must be noted that further use of data 
by third parties is often deliberately not covered by a privacy policy, so that companies are 
exempted from responsibility of third party's processing of data. 
85. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19, at 541. 
86. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 372; McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19, 
at 546; Borgesius, supra note 80, at 31. 
87. Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, Privacy and Trust: The Laudable Goals and 
Ultimate Failure of Notice and Choice to Respect Privacy Online, 18 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 
2, 2013), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/frn/article/view/4838/3802 (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
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an aggregation of pieces of data by different entities. 88 Therefore, the 
current privacy self-management "which takes refuge in consent,"89 
through the notice and choice mechanism, does not seem to provide 
people with meaningful control over their data. 
The 'notice and choice' mechanism is especially popular in the U.S., 
but similar considerations can be made in the EU as far as informed 
consent is required to process personal data. 
B. Addressing the drawbacks: alternative mechanisms to traditional 
privacy policies 
1. A legal-technical approach 
The privacy paradox emerging from users' attitudes and behaviour 
online, might be explained in terms oflack of suitable and flexible legal-
technical instruments for users to safeguard their privacy, while they seek 
to enjoy the advantages of innovation and technology. 90 
Attempts to address this lack are not missing, especially in 
multidisciplinary research environments, where scholars, since at least 
two decades, have pointed out the need to achieve a more integrated legal-
technical approach to privacy. 91 The main idea is that many privacy 
concerns and legal implementation issues might be addressed through a 
good technical design that embeds fundamental privacy principles-
better known as the privacy by design approach ("PbD").92 Privacy 
88. So love, supra note 31, at 1888-89. 
89. Id. at 1880. 
90. A point that emerges from these surveys is that users (and in particular the 
youngsters, so called 'Digital Natives') when dispose of adequate mechanisms to avoid 
privacy risks they make better decisions or they create their own strategies. See Pan-European 
Survey of Practices, supra note 18; see also Boyd & Marwick, supra note 78. 
91. See, e.g., Yves Poullet, Pour une Troisieme Generation de Reglementations de 
Protection de Donnees, 3 JUSLETTER (2005); Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal and Technological 
Normativity: More (and Less) than Twin Sisters, 12 TECHNE: RES. PHIL. TECH. 169 (2008); 
ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 2010). 
On the concepts of "Transparency Enhancing Technologies," allowing citizens to possibly 
anticipate how they will be profiled and the consequence of that see Gordon Hull et al., 
Contextual Gaps: Privacy Issues on Facebook, 13 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 289 (2011); Shara 
Monteleone, Privacy and Data Protection at the Time of Facial Recognition: Towards a New 
Right to Digital Identity?, 3 EUR. J. L. TECH. (2012). See Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 52-
59. 
92. See, e.g., Ann Cavukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data 
Ecosystem, PRIVACY BY DESIGN (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/10/pbd-pde.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
This approach was formally embraced in 2010 by Privacy Commissioners at their 32nd 
International Conference, in Jerusalem, where an ad hoc Resolution was adopted. See 
Resolution on Privacy by Design, 320 INT'L CONF. DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 
COMMISSIONERS (Oct. 27-29, 2010), available at 
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enhancing technologies ("PET"), based on specific technical settings that 
embed privacy principles, proved to play a relevant role in support of 
privacy and data protection. 
The European Commission has been promoting for years legal-
technical measures at safeguard of these rights, as essential tools for 
building confidence online. The Draft GDPR now formalizes the Data 
Protection by design and by default principles, introducing specific norms 
and constraints (Article 23). The close and complex relationship between 
ICTs and public policy became particularly evident with the development 
of the Internet and of the Information Society. As stressed in the recent 
EC Communication on Internet Governance:93 "Technical details of 
Internet protocols and other information technology specifications can 
have significant public policy implications. Their design can impact on 
human rights such as users' data protection rights and security, [ and] their 
ability to access diverse knowledge and information .... " The 
Commission, although welcomed the efforts of the international technical 
community to establish approaches to specification setting based on 
public policy concerns,94 acknowledged that key decisions are frequently 
made by technical experts in the absence of efficient mutual interactions 
between technical and public policy considerations. 95 "This is 
particularly important when legal rights of individuals, especially their 
human rights, are clearly impacted."96 
Special attention should be paid in the design of specific Internet 
http://privacyconference201 l .org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/201O_Jerusalem/201 O _J5 .pdf 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
93. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, International 
Policy and Governance Europe's Role in Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, at 4, 8-
9, COM (2014) 72 final (Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Shaping the Future of Internet 
Governance]. 
94. Internet Governance Principles, NETMUNDIAL (Apr. 23-24, 2014), available at 
http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/intemet-governance-principles/176 (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015). Positive examples include recent technical guidance for privacy 
considerations in new protocols. See the guidelines elaborated by the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB), Cooper et al., Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, INTERNET 
ARCHITECTURE BOARD (July 2013), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6973.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015), which are a development of many sets of privacy principles (like the 
Fair Information Practices and the privacy by design frameworks that have been developed in 
different forums over the years). Interestingly, in the recent JAB 's guidelines, user 
participation and interaction is taken into account. 
95. These considerations seem to be at the basis also of the European Commission 
Decision of28 November 2011. See Commission Decision of28 November 201 l on Setting 
up the European Multi-stake Platform on ICT Standardisation, 2011 O.J. (C 349) 4, in which 
a plurality of different actors are called to contribute to the definition of the ICT 
standardization. 
96. Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, supra note 93, at 9. 
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architecture, especially with the advent of new digital and smart 
technologies, given that normativity of technology may be as relevant and 
effective as the normativity of law (though different) and have an impact 
on human behaviour and conduct.97 Moreover, the adoption of ad hoc 
legal-technical measures to improve the level of transparency online like 
"Transparency Enhancing Technologies" ("TETs") is also urged. 98 Most 
users are not even aware that their data are collected or that they are being 
tracked and profiled while surfing the web99 : enhanced transparency 
might help individuals to understand how their personal data are used and 
what the potential dangers are. Given that information flows are growing 
dramatically, TE Ts might be critical. 100 The increase of transparency ( on 
how the data are used) and the availability of easy-to-use privacy-control 
mechanisms are considered essential aspects in order to ensure a 
sustainable flow of data that makes privacy to be a virtue for both 
business and users: 
[While transparency] might initially reduce sharing, it limits the risk 
of brand damage and helps to attract more informed customers . ... 
[P]rivacy controls should be available and easy to use. They will 
significantly increase data-sharing by individuals, likely offsetting any 
negative impact on sharing resulting from increased transparency. 101 
Methods of providing information and offering the right to refuse 
should be as user-friendly as possible. This seems to stem from the e-
Privacy Directive102 and also from the draft GDPR (Article 11). 103 
Therefore, companies should go beyond the drafting oflong and complex 
privacy policies as the most suitable way to inform users about processing 
of their own data and it would be also in their own interests to resort to 
alternatives to traditional notice and choice mechanisms in order to 
increase trust in online practices. Consequently, rather than only using 
97. See Hildebrandt, supra note 69; see also HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds. , 2013). 
98. Hildebrandt, supra note 69. 
99. See generally Borgesius, supra note 79; Hildebrandt & Koops, supra note 59. 
100. See Claude Castelluccia & Arvind Narayanan, Privacy Considerations of Online 
Behavioural Tracking, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR N ETWORK & INFO. SECURITY (Oct. 19, 
2012), available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-
trust/library/deliverables/privacy-considerations-of-online-behavioural-tracking (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2015). 
101. The Value of Our Digital Identity, Boston Consulting Group 17 (2012), available 
at http://www.libertyglobal.com/PDF /public-policy/The-Value-of-Our-Digital-Identity. pdf 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
102. See Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (modified by Council Directive 
2009/136/EC). 
103. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47. 
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written privacy policies that the majority of users do not read, companies 
should engage into alternative ways and instruments-more visual, 
explicit, simple and user-friendly-to inform Internet users and help them 
make aware decisions. 
Among the remedies identified in literature to cope with the 
"laudable goals and ultimate failure of notice and choice to respect 
privacy online,"104 we can find in particular suggestions aimed to: (1) 
ameliorate the current notice and choice structure through opportune 
legislation, industry best practices and privacy enhancing technologies; 
(2) given the limited users' empowerment due to information asymmetry 
and transaction costs, focus on privacy reputation and trust, built by 
companies around respecting privacy expectations; 105 and (3) building on 
a stream of privacy scholarship that looks at a tort-law model of privacy 
protection, 106 develop privacy rules by identifying specific harms and 
consequences of data disclosure. The underlying idea is a shift from the 
notification scheme to managing privacy expectations within a specific 
context: a consequence-based approach to privacy that would be more 
pragmatic and beneficial also for companies than the current notice and 
choice, as the privacy norms would be constructed thinking to the harms 
and not to abstract risks of privacy violations. 
Legal-technical proposals to solve the problem of the burdensome 
requirement of consent also include software personal agents, as an 
automatic way to achieve the protection of privacy. The underlying idea 
is that a technological architecture based on "Privacy Agents," which 
meets a series of legal requirements to ensure the validity of consent 
delivered through such an agent, could be useful to avoid overwhelming 
the data subject with repeated requests of consent, while protecting 
his/her privacy by respecting pre-settled preferences. 107 
Similar measures may be included amid all those technical solutions 
that embed and implement specific legal rules, also known as techno-
regulation. 108 In Ambient Intelligence contexts such as smart 
104. Martin, supra note 87. 
105. In particular, according to Martin, firms have multiple tools at their disposal to 
meet privacy expectations, through three options: increase the obscurity of data exchange so 
to decrease the probability that information will be leaked; decrease the possible harm that 
could come from a leakage by using 'do not use' rules, limiting the use of data; increase the 
benefits of information exchange (possible uses of data) for individuals and society). Id. 
106. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harms, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); 
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS, J. AMERICAN 
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 32 (2011). 
107. Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60. 
108. Bibi van der Berg, Colouring Inside the Lines: Using Technology to Regulate 
Children's Behavior Online, in 24 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & LAW SERIES: MINDING 
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environments/cities (so called due to the capability of the sophisticated 
computer systems used to mine masses of personal and not personal data), 
TETs would allow citizens to anticipate how they will be profiled and 
which consequences this may entail. 109 However, the complexity and 
quantity of information produced by transparency enhancing 
technologies could overwhelm individuals, if this information were 
provided in the form of text, requiring their conscious attention: 
TETs will only succeed in empowering citizens if ... [they do] not 
inundate a person with detailed technical information that requires her 
scrutiny in a way that nullifies all the 'advantages' of ubiquitous and 
seamless computing. . . . [They] will have to communicate the relevant 
information in a way that allows one to have 'a feel' of the environment's 
interpretation of one's behaviour, rather than merely adding more text or 
graphs to the equation. 110 
That is to say that even and primarily in the imminent digitalized 
and automated world, complementary mechanisms should be promoted 
in order to ensure that improved information about data processing is 
provided to the users. Layering of notice may be a step in this direction: 
data controllers may distribute the required information over different 
and progressive layers, such as, the short notice, the condensed notice and 
the complete notice. 111 In general, better ways of presenting information 
to people, short messages together with educational programs may 
mitigate inconvenience. 112 
However, providing simplified, standardized privacy information, 
although of some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient (e.g., cookies 
alerts): users might end up simply ignoring them and accepting all the 
requests of consent, by clicking on numerous message boxes. 113 
Nevertheless, it seems that "there is no limit to the ways in which 
MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY SERIES 67-84 (Simone 
van der Hof et al. eds., 24th ed. 2014); see also Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge or Notice?, 99 IOWA 
L. REV. 773 (2014). 
I 09. Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 53. 
110. Id. (stressing that this, however, does not mean that a more precise access to the 
technical details must not be available, for instance to enable a person being subjected to 
unfair decision making on the basis of automatic profiling, to contest the application of 
profiles in a court of law). 
111. Opinion of the Data Protection Working Party on "More Harmonised Information 
Provisions" (Nov. 25, 2004 ), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp I 00 _ en.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2015); Brendan Van Alsenoy, Privacy-friendly 'model' privacy policies, SECURITY 
& PRIVACY IN ONLINE NETWORKS PROJECT [SPION] (June 2013), available at 
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-2363.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
112. Luzak, supra note 83, 553-54. 
113. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 8. 
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transparency and autonomous decision-making can be stimulated. Future 
research efforts should continue to seek out additional mechanisms to 
enhance transparency, both on ex ante and post fact basis." 114 Therefore, 
instead of rejecting tout court the notice and consent mechanisms as not 
effectively implementing the transparency principle, we should try 
understanding the underlying reasons, the actual users' attitudes and 
behaviours and seek out alternative, innovative and integrated ways to 
enhance them. 115 
2. An integrated behavioural economic approach 
PhD approach and TETs are supposed to increase user's control over 
his personal data. However, advanced technical control mechanisms, 
though necessary, might not be sufficient if relevant cognitive and 
behavioural "biases" in online users are not taken into account: 116 several 
hurdles in privacy decision-making, in fact, have been highlighted by 
behavioural science. 117 
Empirical and social science research demonstrates that "there are 
severe cognitive problems that undermine privacy self-management. 
These cognitive problems impair individuals' ability to make informed, 
rational choices about the costs and benefits of consenting to the 
collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data." 118 In other words, 
it is not enough having complete information about costs and benefits of 
disclosing personal data, as other factors intervene on the user's privacy 
choice and behaviour. 119 This line of enquiry has significant policy 
implications: as it has been noticed, "the modem microeconomic theory 
of privacy suggests that, when consumers are not fully rational or in fact 
myopic, the market equilibrium will tend not to afford privacy protection 
to individuals, and therefore privacy regulation may be needed to 
improve consumer and aggregate welfare." 120 
This seems particularly important if we consider how people think 
and act in the online environment: individuals' cognitive limitations 
mentioned before as regards information explain the failure of the rational 
choice model and of the informed consent (in the U.S., the "notice and 
choice" model) as regulatory techniques. 
114. Van Alsenoy, supra note 111, at 9. 
115. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (an Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2012). 
116. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6. 
117. Id. 
118. Solove, supra note 31, at 1880-81. 
119. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 9. 
120. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6. 
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Behavioural insights help us understand and interpret these 
limitations and fallacies. Moreover, as recent research has shown, 
Behavioural Science, leveraging precisely on these cognitive limitations, 
can also effectively support policy-making in identifying appropriate 
mechanisms, e.g., nudging strategies, to help people's decision-making 
and, eventually, achieving privacy protection in practice. 
Building upon the abovementioned interdisciplinary approach in the 
privacy field (integration of law and technology) a step further is 
proposed here: to learn the lessons from behavioural science 121 and to 
think of applying behavioural insights to policy-making in the area of 
privacy, in the wake of behavioural-informed regulation already 
operational in fields such as reduction of energy consumption, health 
care, consumer protection, etc. 122 
Cognitive psychology and behavioural economics, which provided 
meaningful insights on individuals' behaviour in many domains 123-as 
discussed in the next part of this article-have recently also explained 
users' (apparently contradictory) attitudes and practices as regards their 
privacy protection. 124 Eventually, the privacy paradox receives clearer 
explanation ( and possibly solutions) if looked in light of behavioural 
science. 
What is suggested here is, in other words, to explore not only 
advanced technical versions of transparency mechanisms, but to identify 
and test alternative and complementary measures for users' better 
decision-making as regards data protection; a new approach that, without 
discarding the notice and choice system per se and taking into account 
behavioural insights, may provide more suitable, flexible and effective 
privacy-enhancing mechanisms, such as privacy nudges and "visceral 
notices," so called because based on certain common psychological 
reactions of individuals to design, instead of engaging the slower, 
121. See, e.g., the research activities conducted by the Danish 'i-Nudge-you' team, 
tNUDGEYOU, available at http://www.inudgeyou.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). On the 
increasing interest for behavioral science in policy and government management in USA, see 
also Courtney Subramanian, 'Nudge' Back in Fashion at White House, TIME (Aug. 9, 2013), 
available at http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/09/nudge-back-in-fashion-at-white-house/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015); Professor Kevin Werbach, Beyond Nudges: Gamification as 
Motivational Architecture, Speech at the 2013 CPDP Conference in Brussels (Jan. 23, 2013). 
122. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed 
Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440, 444-45 (Eldar Shafir ed., 
2012). 
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges.gov: Behavioral Economics and Regulation, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 719, 719 (Eyal Zamir & 
Doron Teichman eds., 2014). 
124. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22. 
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reflective way of thinking: they show, rather than tell. 125 
The next part explores this line of research, after briefly considering 
challenges and opportunities of applying behavioural insights to policy-
making in general. These strategies, alternative to traditional privacy 
notices might also represent a better implementation or at least integration 
mechanisms of the Data Protection by Design approach, as codified in 
the draft GDPR (Article 23). 
IIII. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS ON 
INFORMATION PROVISION 
In this part, opportunities and challenges of behavioural sciences 
applied to public policy in general will be discussed, in order to better 
understand the relevance of behavioural insights in the privacy area. 
A. Applying behavioural science to policy: an overview 
Applied behavioural science, often referred to as Behavioural 
Economics ("BE"), studies human behaviour for better policy-making. 
Since the 1970s, BE revealed that people, in their daily life, do not 
always act "rationally," as suggested by neoclassical assumptions in 
economics, making choices that lead to the best outcome for them: on the 
opposite, they often have preferences and take decisions that are not in 
their interests (suboptimal choices): 126 in other words, people are not 
perfectly rational in their cost-benefit considerations. 
These deviations from rationality in individuals' decision-making 
are commonly referred to as biases ( e.g., mental shortcuts or 'rules of 
thumb'), such as: myopia (people prefer short term gratifications to 
disadvantages in long terms); social norms (people are influenced by 
what the majority of people say or do, especially if there is a certain 
affinity with these people--compatriots or neighbours, etc.); status quo 
(people tend to stay with the default options); and.framing or prime effect 
(people are influenced on how more than what information is given to 
them). 
Such findings about human behaviour-very briefly recalled here-
started to be taken into consideration by policymakers in the last decades 
and progressively incorporated in policy interventions focused on 
structuring the "choice architecture" for people's better decisions; the 
choice architecture is understood as the background against which 
decisions are made and that has major consequences for both decisions 
125. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25. 
126. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN , THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 12 (2011). 
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and outcomes. 127 Also, BE highlighted that this does not mean that 
people's behaviour is always irrational, random and unpredictable: on the 
contrary, it can be predicted, modeled and thus guided. 128 
BE has been regarded in recent years as a promising and exciting 
new development in public policymaking theory and practice. 129 
Consequently, the efforts to bring more accurate understanding of human 
behaviour and choice to bear on law 130 have made that BE is now 
considered as the new paradigm for the study of choice behaviour and, 
on its basis, for the adoption of "behavioural informed regulation" 131 in 
the most different policy areas. The behaviourally-informed approach to 
regulatory problems, in fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments, 
so called nudges, in the form of notices, warnings and default rules, 132 are 
becoming authentic policy tools. 
The informal and cheap nature of these systems makes them more 
appealing as compared to traditional coercive regulatory mechanisms, 
like prohibitions, bans, etc. This regulatory approach is also called 
libertarian paternalism, because leveraging insights on individuals' 
attitudes and behaviours, claims to preserve their freedom of choice: the 
combination of paternalism and individual freedom would not be an 
oxymoron. This system is also named soft paternalism as opposed to 
hard paternalism. 133 
A number of public and private institutions have already embraced 
this approach as its instruments proved to be more effective than common 
legal instruments in addressing old and new challenges, like the energy 
consumptions reduction, health care, saving accounts, etc. In the U.S., 
the Obama Administration intensively counted on behavioural findings 
127. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 1. 
128. See Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm, 55 AM . 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1099, 1102-03 (2011); Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 122, at 440. 
129. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims 
Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014), who, however, urge for greater awareness 
of the tension between the two "seductive" dimensions of Behavioural Law and Economics 
(its appeal as social science and politics) and consequent limits. Accordingly, policy-makers 
can in future resort to Behavioural economics for improving the design of law and policy 
(adopting choice-preserving regulatory tools) in more appropriate and context-dependent 
ways, i.e. pondering advantages and disadvantages of the different regulatory mechanisms 
(traditional or new) available. 
130. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
131. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).; Mullainathan & Shafir, supra 
note 122, at 428. 
132. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131. 
133. See Oren Bar-Grill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465,478 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). 
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for a number of initiatives and in UK an ad hoc 'Behavioural Insights 
team' within the Cabinet office has been created. 134 At the intersection 
of"applied behavioural science, public institutions, NGO's and private 
stakeholders" are initiatives such as iNudgeYou - initiated as a Danish 
Nudging Network and become an international landmark. 135 
European policy-making is also increasingly relying on behavioural 
insights, both at its design and its implementation phases. Surveys to 
collect consumers' perceptions and preferences, lab experiments and 
more accurate behavioural observation methods (i.e., randomized 
controlled trials) are promoted by the EU in different areas of 
intervention, with the aim to foster better individuals' decision-
making.136 Behavioural insights are, for instance, at the basis of the 
recent regulation aimed to limit the default options in consumer contracts 
or to improve consumer protection in booking travel packages. 137 As a 
new but quite spread trend, varying communitarian goals are being 
pursued through nudging strategies such as "green behaviors," 138 as well 
as improvement in consumer decisions regarding, for instance, retail 
investments139 or, more recently, digital purchases. 140 
B. Applying behavioural science to policy: challenges and 
134. See Who We Are, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, available at 
http://www.behaviouralinsights.eo.uk/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
135. See iNudgeyou - The Danish Nudge Unit, tNUDGEYOU, available at 
http://inudgeyou.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
136. See generally Rene van Bavel et al., Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU Policy-
Making, JRC SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REPORTS EUR 26033 EN 14-19 (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health _consumer/information_ sources/ docs/30092013 jrc _ sci en ti fie 
_policy _report_ en.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
137. See Council Directive 2011/83, art. 22, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 81 (EU); see also 
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council On 
Package Travel and Assisted Travel Arrangements, at 4, COM (2013) 512 final (Sept. 7, 
2013). 
138. See, e.g., Science for Environmental Policy Future Brief Green Behaviour, EUR. 
COMMISSION (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/future _ briefs.htm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
139. See, e.g., Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf(last visited Dec. 20, 
2015). 
140. See, e.g., Gabriele Esposito, Consumer Information in the Digital Online Market -
A Behavioral Approach, CIDOM REP., JRC SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL REP. 5, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/report _ cidom _ final.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2015). 
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opportunities 
As said before, policy-making is increasingly relying on behavioural 
studies and nudging strategies for citizens' better decision-making in 
different areas of intervention. 
This happens, however, not without concerns. 141 Applying 
behavioural science to policy-making requires a thorough consideration 
of a number of different issues. 142 At least two main categories of 
problems can be identified as far as the application of the behavioural 
approach to policy-making is concerned. On the one hand, the legal 
grounds of its mechanisms that rely on influence and persuasion in order 
to obtain a behaviour change and creates a new power, potentially subject 
to abuse. On the other, their (lack of) generalized applicability: a nudge 
might not have the expected outcome if used in different areas or with 
different audiences. 
The same legitimacy of the nudging system itself within a 
democratic society might be put in doubt or at least questioned. 143 Most 
existing criticisms seem to point to the fact that, while a good nudge 
influences individual choices without changing freedom of choice, 
sometimes the line between persuasion and manipulation is not easy to 
see and goes together with the fear of being maneuvered. 
Nudges can be stronger or weaker than the law and coercive as well, 
but the problem is the risk that they might be adopted without the legal 
safeguards proper of the legislative processes. Moreover the effect of 
nudges may be very different, depending on context or on the interests of 
the parties involved. 144 
A substantial regulation of these alternative measures is, therefore, 
urged, capable to formalize these behavioural-informed mechanisms and 
141. See, e.g., Karen Yeung, Nudge as Fudge, 75 MODERN L. REV. 122, 123-24 (2012); 
see also Alberto Alemanno & Alessandro Spina, Nudging Legally. On the Checks and 
Balances of Behavioural Regulation, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 429 (2014). 
142. Neven Mimica, Applying Behavioural Insights to Policy-Making: Results, 
Promises and Limitations (Sept. 30, 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/consumer_affairs_events_en. 
htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) ( discussing the opportunities and limitations of applying 
behavioral science to policy making in all areas of interest at a European Commission 
conference in Brussels). 
143. See Pelle G. Hansen & Andreas M. Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of 
Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour Change 
in Public Policy, 4 EuR. J. RISK REG. 3, 5 (2013); Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 445. 
See generally Anne van Aaken, Judge the Nudge: In Search of the Legal Limits of 
Paternalistic Nudging in the EU, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 83 
(Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015). 
144. See generally Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1155 (2013). 
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to guarantee an oversight system of the new kind of power they bring 
with. 145 Notwithstanding their informal nature, and given their 
persuasive quality, the adoption of these mechanisms cannot circumvent 
basic principles of the State of Law, such as legality and impartiality. An 
appropriate oversight system on behavioural-informed tools can 
guarantee a smooth integration of behavioural science into public policy. 
As some scholars propose: 
[A] general requirement imposed to public administrations to 
systematically consider formalized behavioral mechanisms at the pre-
legislative stage could serve to accommodate in a more principled and 
consistent way these insights into policy making while at the same time 
protecting them from possible abuses. 146 
Their enclosure within the framework of essential legal principles 
like proportionality seems necessary. These behavioural-based measures 
should be pondered according to minimum criteria: their capacity of 
pursuing a legitimate goal (i.e., individual, societal welfare); their 
suitability; necessity ( other available measures are not effective); 
proportionality stricto sensu (i.e., the mildest measure have been chosen); 
and foreseeability ( at least as regards their purposes and consequences). 
Invisible, non-transparent nudges should be considered not admissible. 147 
A concrete guideline for policy-makers in order to avoid the 
adoption of tools of illegitimate manipulation of people's choice, may be 
the distinction between transparent and non-transparent nudges, which 
might help to distinguish the manipulative use of nudges from other kinds 
of uses and therefore to adopt a more responsible use of nudging approach 
to behavioural change. 148 In particular, the choice of policy-makers 
should fall on nudges aimed at promoting decision-making in ways that 
are transparent to the people influenced, by "making features, actions, 
preferences, and/ or consequences salient, or by providing 
feedback .... " 149 This kind of interpreting and guiding frameworks for 
the use of 'nudges for good' should be endorsed so that nudges, if chosen 
and adopted as policy tools, can work at the service of libertarian 
paternalism. 150 
Another aspect that should be borne in mind, is that alternative, non-
traditional methods of changing citizens' behaviour, whether they are 
145. See generally id. at 1229. 
146. Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 455. 
147. van Aaken, supra note 143, at 29-33. 
148. Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 143, at 23. 
149. Id. at 24. 
150. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5-6. 
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classified as code (like in the techno-regulation), nudges, or notice 
(information disclosure), may both facilitate (help) or hinder (friction) 
decision-making and a certain conduct. 151 
Some non-traditional public interventions, if focused on obstacles or 
barriers, may be more coercive than the law; physical barriers or digital 
ones (code) like Digital Right Management Systems ("ORM") to enhance 
copyrights, but also psychological ones, like some new virtual speed 
limits made of painted images on the road (nudges) introduce an obstacle 
to a conduct, making it harder or impossible for the individual to act 
differently. In this case, resisting to a nudge is not without costs, like 
discomfort, time associated to overcoming the architecture of the choice; 
the individual autonomy in these cases might be unreasonably 
jeopardized. In other words, the problem with these alternative measures 
based on friction, would consist in the fact that they may introduce costs 
and burdens to citizens while, meantime, they may be adopted without 
the legal safeguards and guarantees proper of the legislative processes, 
i.e., to be discussed, voted on by elected representatives and in cases, 
challenged. 
However, as Calo stresses, alternative mechanisms for behavioural 
changes do not necessary and always need to build upon friction, like 
they do some technical barriers to replace the deterrence function of law 
(e.g., the doors accessing to a metro station, or the DRMs for copyright 
protection, or the digital filters installed on a computer for the safety of 
children). 152 Alternative systems should work by helping, nudging, 
citizens to arrive to their own goals; instead of studying human behaviour 
and cognitive biases in order to contrast them, it is better to help them. 
An example may be represented by placing fruits or other healthy food at 
eye-level in the cafeteria of a working place. 
If policy intervention aims at modifying the choice architecture, 
altering physical or digital environment, this should be not to impede, 
prevent certain conducts but to facilitate better decision-making: "the 
technology should keep its capacity to enhance and not diminish certain 
essential democratic processes."153 Accordingly, regulators should 
explore the possibilities for helping citizens (in using code, nudge or 
notice mechanisms-or a combination of them) in achieving by 
themselves their own goals, before introducing forms of alternative but 
coercive mechanisms ( which may lack the safeguards and the process of 
the law). 
151. Calo, supra note 108, at 777. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 798. 
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Therefore, when deciding about changes in architecture, regulators' 
preference should be, where possible, for facilitation not for imposing 
barriers, according to the theory that "we should abandon the safeguards 
that [ support the] law only when it can be said that we are helping citizens 
do what they would do if they had the right information and tools." 154 
As Calo stresses, combining certain elements of different strategies 
provides more possibilities for facilitation. 155 A traditional notice does 
not work, but elements of code and nudge may improve notices so to 
become more effective, especially when notices are provided at the point 
of decision-making and this is particularly relevant in the field of privacy 
and data protection, as discussed below. 
An example of successful notice mechanism relying on "nudging" 
is offered by initiatives seeking to curb obesity, which instead of focusing 
on traditional notice mechanisms like caloric information labels to 
ameliorate people's eating/drinking habits, show the physical activity 
equivalent needed to bum a certain amount of calories, e.g., running, 
biking, etc., 156 or seek to directly encourage people to do more 
exercise. 157 
This facilitation role is not an easy task either; it is difficult to 
understand when and how to facilitate decision-making (and to renounce 
it because it does not work). Decision-making can depend entirely on the 
framing or on the context, but in doubt of what influences our 
preferences, we should adopt, as a guiding principle, facilitation rather 
thanfriction. 158 At the end of the day, it is not important how we label a 
public intervention in the choice-architecture as code, notice or nudge, 
but regulators should look at the interventions that help. This can 
mitigate also the concerns mentioned before about the legitimacy of 
nudging strategies. 
C. Applying behavioural science to policy: from information overload 
to smart disclosure in Consumer Protection and in Data Protection 
As demonstrated in other sectors ( marketing or organization 
science), the excess of information may have a negative effect on users' 
choice quality. 159 
154. Id. at 800. 
155. Id. 
156. Sara N. Bleich et al., Reduction in Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 
Among Low-Income Black Adolescents After Exposure to Caloric Information, 102 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 329 (2012). 
157. Amitai Etzioni, On Curbing Obesity, 51 Soc'y 115 (2014). 
158. See Calo, supra note 108. 
159. See generally Byung-Kwan Lee & Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information 
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Insights from behavioural studies have shown, in fact, that even 
when presented with full information, consumers may not always be able 
to understand or use information in their interest, i.e., to make the best 
choice. This can be due to not necessarily the lack of information, but to 
the fact that most of the information is not good; moreover, too much 
information ( although correct and accurate) may be useless and even 
harmful. There is a moment in the information acquisition (like for the 
information that we receive when we decide to buy a product or service) 
in which the cost that a consumer has to spend to process the information 
is higher than the benefit of ignoring it: this is also called "information 
overload." 160 
Studies on information overload and its effects on consumer 
decision-making suggest that what matters is not (necessarily) to provide 
the consumer with more information but to provide her with the good 
one. 161 
This is particularly relevant in the digital environment, on the 
Internet, where users are constantly exposed to tons of information 
difficult or impossible to absorb, to interpret and to use. The problem 
with the traditional information notices (including privacy notices) is that 
they constitute in many cases an example of "information overload." 
Burdening the individual with information (whether it is on products and 
services or on how personal data is processed or protected), is not the 
solution. 
As said before, one of the main lessons that policy-makers receive 
from behavioural scientists is to work on the choice architecture, the 
social background against which consumer decisions are made. 162 In this 
way policy-makers are called to become a sort of choice architects, able 
to make the appropriate, small changes in the underlying environment 
that may have a large impact on people's behaviour. "Such changes may 
involve disclosure, warnings, default rules, increased salience, and use of 
social norms."163 
Overload on Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, 21 PSYCHOL. & 
MARKETING 159 (2004). 
160. Id. at 177-78. 
161. See the example of the regulatory measure adopted in US to counter the level of 
obesity and imposing requirements to indicate the calories information on restaurant menus, 
which did not get the expected results as people ignored them. Brian Eibel et al., Calorie 
Labeling, Fast Food Purchasing and Restaurant Visits, 21 OBESITY 2172 (2013). 
162. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131. 
163. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental 
Protection 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper No. RPP-
2013-19, 2013). 
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The most important modification that should be made is salience: 164 
salience of certain product's features or of a situation (like prices, sizes, 
incentives), and, above all, of the information to be provided to people 
about these features. Salience can work, in fact, as a nudge. 165 Therefore, 
the information that people receive should be salient, upon salient 
features and provided in a moment and a situation salient for these 
people, enabling a process of "smart disclosure," i.e., of a more effective 
information provision by those who are responsible for - that the public 
policy is called to encourage. 
Behavioural studies have invalidated a typical assumption 
underlying many of the current public policies in consumer protection, 
i.e., that individuals would make a cognitive effort to weigh costs and 
benefits before taking a decision like buying or not buying a product. In 
this way, they not only have shown that biases are also typical of policy-
makers ( as made of human beings), but building upon Kahneman' s 
insights about human cognitive processes, 166 have also highlighted that 
people predominantly use the fast thinking system, that is, more intuitive, 
more instinctive and rapid way of making decisions. 167 
This suggests that traditional information policies are disregarding 
important components of human cognitive process that reflect into 
consumers' behaviour and that this might be the reason of their failure to 
realize societal and individual best interests. This raised the question 
whether a different, innovative policy intervention might be necessary to 
help consumers adopt decisions in their best interests. 168 
An important finding of BE (which has also shown to be useful in 
order to attain a better public policy by conducting ad hoc experiments) 
is that the more our activities are routinized, repeated on a daily basis, the 
more we employ the fast thinking system. This is particularly interesting 
for the decisions we take every day with regards to digital activities 
( electronic communications, e-transactions, access to a service or 
product); our activities on the Internet (and on the mobile digital 
applications) are often made of repetitive and systematic gestures: 
clicking a button while visiting websites, downloading applications or 
164. Id. at 6, 9, 15-16. 
165. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 721. 
166. Kahneman, in particular, makes the distinction between thinkingfast and thinking 
slow, and, as a consequence, between automatic behaviours and reflective choices. See 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 126. 
167. Id. 
168. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Enhancing Competition in 
Telecommunications: Protecting and Empowering Consumers, at 39, OECD Doc. 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)1/FINAL (May 24, 2008). 
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documents, sharing thoughts or pictures, etc. This is particularly true 
with regard to terms and conditions of an online contract, that, in most of 
the cases, we accept without reading them, as well as with regard to 
privacy policies. 
In light of recent specialized studies on users' privacy attitudes and 
preferences, in fact, what was just observed for consumer information 
seems to be valid for information privacy and related users' behaviour. 169 
Consumer Protection ( strictu sensu) and Data Protection are two 
interconnected (though distinct) areas.17° First, because the two fields 
correspond to two very close EU law domains; the status of data subject 
and of online consumer are often aligned or overlapping, with the data 
subject being very often also, in the meantime, a consumer; secondly, 
because the information provision obligation (bearing on data controller 
or on service provider, who may coincide) and its effects on the 
corresponding individual's decision-making has equivalent relevance (in 
one case, regarding his consumer behaviour in buying a product/service, 
in the other one his citizens' behaviour in disclosing (or not) personal 
data). 
Given the extraordinary growth of Internet services and online 
transactions, Data Protection is becoming increasingly important for 
consumer. 171 The attention for it, therefore, is increasing, as it may 
represent one of the instruments to realize the consumer protection. 172 In 
other words, data protection is also ( and in addition to its independent 
status of a fundamental right) a way to attain consumer protection, 
especially online; thus, similarities in the assessment of legal and non-
legal tools employed to strengthen individuals protection in the two 
fields, namely information notices and nudges, may be drawn. 
Recently, policy-makers started to work on minimizing detriment to 
the consumer's interest resulting not only from a lack of information or 
misleading information regarding services and products, but also from 
169. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22. 
170. See IRIS B ENOHR, EU CONSUM ER LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 166 (2013). 
171. Id.at59 . 
I 72. The consumer protection has a principle status in the Charter of Fundamental Right 
of the EU (Article 38), in the sense that it is intended as a legal principle rather than to have 
the status of a subjective right. However, as other legal principles, this provision in the 
Charter could evolve in the future and become a right (maybe with the development of the 
case law). In particular it may become more concrete if it applied in combination with other 
rights of the Charter. Id. (demonstrating that it is already happening). Article 38 could be 
applied in combination with other rights of the Charter or constitutional provisions, for 
instance with Article 8 on the right to data protection "in fact in some national cases a 
cumulative application of basic provisions has resulted in successful claims for individuals." 
Id. at 64. 
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the "bounded rationality" of consumer decision-making. 173 If the 
individual, recipient of the disclosure, is overwhelmed by information 
without the possibility to discern what information is important, then 
disclosure will have little positive effect. Behavioural studies have 
demonstrated that alternative ways that try to induce people to behave in 
their best interests may work better than traditional notice and choice or 
"command and control" measures. 174 Regulators can learn how to 
enhance information disclosure's effectiveness: "Disclosure has many 
limitations, but there is also great opportunity for enhancing its beneficial 
effects." 175 
Consumer protection passes also by competition enhancing 
policies 176 that focus their attention on demand side analysis (i.e., based 
on insights from consumers' behaviour analysis). Policymakers and 
regulators started to consider the needs and motivations underlying 
consumer behaviour in communication markets, while in the meantime, 
raising awareness about possible risks for consumers as well as 
opportunities of protection. A main instrument to improve consumer 
protection (and satisfaction) online has been identified in the quality of 
information provision. New requirements have been introduced 
compelling, for instance, all major service operators to provide complete, 
comparable and accurate information to consumers to reduce the 
"information asymmetry" between operator and consumer and to enable 
the latter to take the most suitable choices among products and services 
offered online and therefore, among providers. 177 
Likewise, we assisted to a proliferation of information obligations 
and accountability rules in the Data Protection law, also in view of 
ensuring a fair development of the digital single market, increasingly an 
173. Id. at 81-82. 
174. See Applying Behavioural Insights to Reduce Fraud, U.K. CABfNET OFF. 
BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM (2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/60539/BIT _FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
175. Sunita Sah, Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein, Confessing One's Sins But 
Still Committing Them: Transparency and the Failure of Disclosure, in BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC 
POLICY 148, 158 (Adam Oliver ed., 2013). 
176. OECD, supra note 168, at 5. 
177. The idea is that further developments in competition policy should serve the 
consumer interest. See id. at 6. The purpose of pro-competition policy is to enhance consumer 
welfare; in other words, consumer protection and empowerment should be based on pro-
competition policy and mechanisms that have the consumer interest as priority. Id. at 4 
("[W]here consumers have little information or poor quality information ... they may end up 
misled and confused by the choices on offer, may pay too much or buy the wrong service. 
This may, in tum, inhibit and dampen the competitive process .... [Consumers] need to be 
able to move quickly and with the minimum constraint between service providers."). 
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information-rich market. Providing innovative and more effective 
information mechanisms for privacy may also prove to be an innovative 
and effective competition-enhancing tool, which may benefit individuals 
as well as businesses and the market in general. 
Insights from BE, in fact, recently proved to be helpful also to 
explain the privacy paradox (i.e., even in the presence of privacy notices 
and warnings, 178 users tend to disclose a large amount of data) and to find 
more effective privacy-enhancing mechanisms. 
A multitude of systematic deviations from rational decision-making 
that seems to have an impact on users' privacy decisions-making, besides 
"incomplete information" and a "bounded cognitive ability" to process 
the available information ( information asymmetry and transactional 
costs), has been identified. 179 These deviations can be explained through 
the same cognitive biases that BE has revealed in other areas: individuals 
cannot see the risks deriving in the future from their data disclosure ( or 
from the use of a service that implies automatic data collection) and go 
for immediate gratification of, for instance, free service (myopia); users 
tend to stick with default options, this highlights the relevance of default 
privacy settings for the privacy online; few users change them in practice 
(status quo); users' privacy behaviour seems to be more influenced by an 
image or an alert than by a long, though comprehensive, text (framing 
effect). 
Several behavioural biases, therefore, come into play and are critical 
for the effectiveness of privacy policies. Like the legal information 
notices on products and services relevant in consumer transactions, 
privacy policies "are important transparency mechanisms, but are not 
likely to be decisive in determining user behavior .... [They] are [not] 
salient to consumers .... " 180 Although these reflections on privacy 
policies are related to consumer's behaviour in the context of online 
transactions, they are seemingly applicable to users' privacy behaviour in 
178. A clarification is needed. The concepts of information notices and warning 
messages may be (legally and technically) distinct and may have different purposes that 
should be taken into account when testing and assessing users ' willingness to disclose data: 
basically, the first have the purpose to inform about what/how data are collected and 
protected, about users' rights, about the identity of the data controller, etc., while the warning 
messages work as caveats, admonitions about possible risks of data disclosure: privacy 
policies may contain both type of information, but, generally, current polices are made 
predominantly of the first type. 
179. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 364. 
180. See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 36-37, where it is argued that only if privacy 
choices are embedded in a given transaction and effectuated by rules surrounding the sign-up 
are consumers likely to align with their privacy preferences: "Hence, opt-in and opt-out rules 
as well as default settings have strong impacts on the level of data disclosure." 
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general, when facing information provisions. 
There is a need for making the access to privacy policies easier, 
simpler, agile and therefore more effective, so that users may be able to 
make more informed decisions regarding the ( direct or indirect) 
disclosure of their personal information online. 181 
IV. TOW ARDS REGULATED PRIVACY NUDGES? 
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data 
( often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in 
addressing the gap between existing legal privacy safeguards and 
implementing tools. Therefore, like for other areas of policy intervention, 
a better understanding of data subjects' behaviour should be of interest 
for policymakers as it can assist them to design better privacy policies 
and, ultimately, to fill in this gap; behavioural insights can be applied so 
to identify and adopt innovative privacy-protecting measures. 
The solution to the privacy paradox, in fact, does not seem to be the 
introduction of new principles and rules. Behavioural economics propose 
the introduction of (tested) tools like "privacy nudges" to be applied in 
contexts of behavioural advertising, location sharing and social 
networks. 182 More suitable, effective privacy tools, capable to keep pace 
with modem times, but especially to support users in their decision-
making, i.e., "supporting-choice mechanisms," 183 should be introduced. 
As said in the previous part, behavioural science applied to policy-
making is not new to European institutions, as a number of experimental 
studies in support of policy initiatives are being run by the European 
Commission. Still, the consideration of behavioural insights in the 
specific area of privacy is very limited in Europe, both at academic and 
institutional levels and restricted to the analysis of behavioural patterns 
in online users as regards their data disclosure habits. 
Few experimental studies have been commenced in the EU, as 
discussed below. However, there hasn't been so far, to my knowledge, 
any completed experimental study in Europe testing the nudging effects 
on users' behaviour, as a way to foster a privacy-protective behaviour, 
nor the application of behavioural science to policy-making in the area of 
privacy. Also in Europe, we should support the idea that, instead of 
discarding the option of notice and choice (i.e., informed consent), 
181. See generally Acquisiti & Grossklags, supra note 22. 
182. Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics to the Behavioral Economics of Privacy: 
A Note, in ETHICS AND POLICY OF BIOMETRICS 23, 23-26 (Ajay Kumar & David Zhang eds., 
2010). 
183. van Aaken, supra note 143, §III, § C. 
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because it is not effective, it is worthy to try improving it with nudging 
mechanisms, which help citizens to make their decisions on data 
protection/disclosure, i.e., using appropriate behaviour insights to create 
more effective privacy notices. 
Privacy nudges, as complementary regulatory tools would seek at 
encouraging, at nudging a privacy-protective behaviour, while preserving 
the freedom of choice of the users, achieving the soft or libertarian 
paternalism: as said before, it is not an oxymoron, if well interpreted and 
implemented. 184 There seems to be enough space for its application also 
in the privacy area. 
Nudging privacy seems to be possible and desirable, once the 
conditions for its application (similar to those applicable to other areas) 
are satisfied, i.e.: (1) the privacy nudges are subject to an oversight 
mechanism and proportionality test; (2) given that these mechanisms may 
have a double side quality (i.e., preserving and compromising freedom at 
the same time), avoid that users are heavily charged with the 
responsibility of DP; (3) the privacy nudges have been proven to work-
i.e., to have a positive impact on a target, being it privacy-preserving 
behaviour or increased awareness; and ( 4) ensure control mechanisms of 
companies compliance with DP obligations, the latter point may entail 
strengthening the powers of national DP authorities. Further research 
may investigate the best and efficient way to identify and implement 
these control mechanisms. 
Soft paternalism and nudging strategies, under these conditions, can 
be the way forward for privacy protection online. 
A. Visceral notices 
Against this background, and without dismissing a rights-based 
approach, perhaps it is time also in Europe to build upon that strand of 
international lawyers and behavioural scientists who have proposed a 
new dimension of privacy notices as innovative strategies that impact 
privacy-related attitudes, like the so-called "visceral notices."185 The 
main underlying idea is that information notices should have less text and 
more interaction. 
Unlike traditional notice that relies upon text or symbols to convey 
information, "emerging strategies of 'visceral' notice leverage a 
consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn or inform." 186 
Moreover, they prove to be useful tools to better inform users about data 
184. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 313-27. 
185. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 3. 
186. Calo, supra note 115, at l 027. 
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collection practices (i.e., hidden collection). 
Some visceral notices are particularly interesting because based on 
"certain common psychological reactions to design to change a 
consumer's mental model of a product or service; and 'showing' 
consumers instead of 'telling' them, i.e., demonstrating the result of 
company practices for the specific consumer, rather than describing the 
practices themselves." 187 
Previous experiments 188 not only demonstrated the weakness of 
traditional explicit notices, but also that visceral notices are more 
successful at eliciting privacy-protective behaviour, by pulling users' 
automatic responses. 189 Visceral notices, such as an interactive character 
that speaks or moves her eyes while user types or moves the mouse, or 
the display of the user's location or browsing history, seem to affect 
privacy-related attitudes and behaviours. 
Not every nudge has the same effect and is interchangeable, though. 
A relevant finding of these studies is that a visceral notice represented by 
an informal interface ("informal condition") to be employed, for instance, 
in children's websites, prove to reduce privacy concerns, but also to 
increase data disclosure by users, making the informal design problematic 
for data protection and privacy policy. 
User data disclosure is a complex behaviour. 190 People disclose their 
information also indirectly, that is, when they are not asked (directly) to 
reveal their data, when they are not alerted to the sensitivity of the 
information itself and therefore not urged to "regulate" the disclosure of 
information. In the indirect disclosure ( very frequent in Web browsing), 
the traditional notice mechanism clearly fails its goal: 
The drive to regulate does not minimize passive [i.e., indirect] 
disclosure. Passive disclosure is more successfully minimized with 
visceral notice strategies, such as interactive agents, because they 
directly affect the desire to disclose and do not rely on the more 
thoughtful process of determining if privacy is threatened. 191 
The use of a visceral notice such as an interactive agent ( e.g., an 
anthropomorphic silhouette), minimizes user's data disclosure, without 
relying on service provider's privacy policy. In other words, it appears 
that this kind of visceral notice has better impact on the user's "fast 
thinking." 
187. Id. at 1033-34. 
188. Id. at 1054. 
189. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 28. 
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Most important, this sort of nudge seems to succeed in eliciting 
privacy-protective behaviour, reducing data disclosure without creating 
privacy concerns (what traditional transparency tools usually do). 
1. The BREVE experimental project: Behavioural Responses to Privacy 
Visceral Notices 
Building upon previous research on "visceral notices" 192 and on 
"privacy nudges,"193 the project Behavioural Responses to Privacy 
Visceral Notices ("BREVE") has been undertaken by one of the research 
institutes of the European Commission between 2013 and 2014. 194 
This study examines, via an online experiment and a survey, how 
users' online behaviour changes when they are exposed to visceral 
notices195 and real-time alerts about the data collection practices 
associated with their online activities. 196 The underlying idea is to assert 
to what extent the use of well-designed, intuitive notices effectively 
change users' behaviour as regard personal data disclosure. 197 The goal 
192. Id. 
193. Yang Wang et al., Privacy Nudges for Social Media: An Exploratory Facebook 
Study, PROC. OFTHE22 INT'LCONF. WWW COMPANION (2013). See generally Leslie K. John 
et al., The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Personal Information 
(July 6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l430482 (last visited Dec. 20, 2015); 
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy and Technology: Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013); Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral 
Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE SECURITY & PRIY ACY 82, 82, 84 (2009); 
Alessandro Acquisti et al. , The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 
49 J. MARKETfNG RES. 160 (2012). 
194. Behavioral Economics , JOINT RES. CENTRE, available at 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/BE/BEindex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (for more 
information about the BREVE project). 
195. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27. 
196. In particular, a series of online experiments on EU users, in which 8 conditions, 
represented by different privacy notices, is run: beside the traditional (standard and simplified 
text notices), five types of more innovative notices are displayed to different groups of on line 
participants, who were asked to assess a new (mock-up) search engine, in particular: an 
anthropomorphic agent (static and interactive); the IP and the search history (displayed on a 
side of the screen); an informal interface (colourful and youngish appearance). Wang, supra 
note 193. 
197. The online experiment involves, in the first phase, the construction of a mock-up 
search engine that the participants are invited to evaluate through a survey; in the second part, 
participants are asked to choose among some trivial questions and search for their answers 
through the search engine: in this phase, the choice of the questions is what matters most. 
Since these questions vary in terms of the nature and amount of personal information they 
lead participants to reveal, the choice of questions by participants represents a measure of 
their level of indirect disclosure of personal information. In fact, one of the three questions 
in each set (randomly) is a personal data-disclosure question (such as: "What is the street 
address of a post office in the town where you live?"). The differences among treatments is 
given by the presentation of different privacy notices (including visceral notices), that are 
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is to check if any of the treatments affects participants' privacy concerns, 
if it leads to a significant different personal data disclosure (both direct 
or indirect data disclosure) and what policy considerations can be 
drawn. 198 
B. Integrating behavioural insights into privacy policy making? 
Once the issues on legitimacy of innovative privacy notices (namely 
visceral notices or privacy nudges) are addressed and after having tested 
their effectiveness in changing users' behaviours via ad hoc, reliable 
experiments, the attention should then turn to consider when and how to 
integrate these mechanisms into policy-making ( and into real life). 
Behavioural science can be applied to public policies whenever 
there is a behavioural element to them. It can help design new policies, 
suggest improvements to existing ones, or provide ex-post explanations 
of why the target group of a specific policy reacted in a particular way. 199 
When considering at what stages of policy-making behavioural 
insights and its strategies should be introduced, 200 behavioural aspects 
should be incorporated (at least) in the following phases of privacy 
policy-making: 
First of all, at the first stage of the policy design, where policy-
makers seek to understand users' behaviour surveys on online users' 
practices as regards their personal data ( e.g., biases explaining privacy 
paradox) have been run in several countries as mentioned before and also 
in the EU; an example is given in the Special Eurobarometer 359/11 and 
related report published by the Eurpoean Commission ("EC") in 2011.201 
Other specific studies are not missing in Europe, like the one on privacy-
friendly default settings, carried out within the SPION project. 202 
However, in order to test the responses of users to innovative privacy 
strategies, field trails, from which policy recommendations may be 
drawn, are needed-like those started to be run in the U.S. on privacy 
expected to (differently) impact users' disclosive behaviour. Id. 
198. At the time of writing, the BREVE experiment is underway: results of which are 
expected to be published soon. 
199. See Rene van Bavel et al., supra note 136. 
200. Id.; see also Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141. 
201. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 6. 
202. See generally Alessandro Acquisti & Fred Stutzman, Behavioral Aspects of Privacy 
in Online Social Networks, SPION (Dec. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.spion.me/workpackage/behavioral-aspects-of-privacy-in-online-social-networks 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
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nudges203 and visceral notices. 204 These responses are still not enough 
explored in Europe and studies like BREVE ( where a series of different 
privacy notices are tested on EU users) are exceptional. 205 
Still at the policy design stage, behavioural insights may be 
employed in the context of the Impact Assessment ("IA"), as one of the 
pillars of the EC better regulation strategy in different areas of policy 
intervention. 206 The IA document accompanying the EC Proposal for a 
GDPR makes some reference to behavioural research; however, more 
could be done at this level. 
As Alemanno & Spina notice, "behavioural considerations may 
allow policy makers to not only consider a broader set of regulatory 
options and test their effectiveness through Randomized Controlled 
Trials ("RCTs"), but also to empower citizens to have a say thus 
increasing the accountability of the regulatory outcome. " 207 These 
considerations should include testing the policy options (via in field 
experiments). 
Secondly, at the formal stage of law-making process, transferring 
behavioural considerations into primary or secondary law. At this step, 
several issues should be considered in future research, such as: should the 
law impose stricter requirements for online privacy policies, to be 
'visceral' and effective208 ( e.g., requirements related to the website 
architectural design or also on the pursued behavioural change effect)?; 
How detailed should the privacy law be in this regard?; Would the 
introduction of specific legal requirements for effective privacy policies, 
like visceral notices, be feasible and affordable for industry and 
consumers?; and Would the visceral privacy notices be better introduced 
with soft law instruments (e.g., recommendations), in which evidence-
based models of privacy measures might be strongly urged to industry? 
Third, at the implementation level: 
203. See Acquisti, supra note 182, at 24-25. 
204. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 15. 
205 . Needless to say that experiments of this kind on users' behaviour should be 
conducted in compliance with legal and ethical principles, starting from informing the 
participants about the purposes of the tests ( at least about the general goals and before using 
their data). Principles seem to not have been followed by some social networks in their recent 
practices. For example, for a week, Facebook members were unwitting participants of an 
experiment in direct emotional manipulation. Alex Wilhelm, Facebook and the Ethics of 
User Manipulation, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2014), available at 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/29/facebook-and-the-ethics-of-user-manipulation/ (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
206. Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 4, SEC (2009) 92 final (Jan. 15, 2009). 
207. Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 456. 
208. See Calo, supra note 115, at 1071-72. 
46
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/4
2015] Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent 115 
It would be possible to introduce more innovative privacy notices 
through implementing acts of supranational or national legislation, like 
implementing acts of the European Commission or European guidelines. 
Some good examples already exist but are limited to better information 
provisions. 209 
Another possible integration of behavioural insights at this level 
might be within the specific Data Protection Impact Assessment that any 
controller will be required to run according to the Draft GDPR, when 
"processing operations present specific risks to the rights and freedoms 
of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes" 
(Article 33).210 The use of behavioural insights might be very useful, as 
it would allow to better assess the impact of risky technologies on users' 
privacy and their perceptions, as well as the effectiveness of privacy-
protecting measures to be adopted by the data controller. 
However, this would not be painless. Several issues are at stake. 
Should behavioural considerations be imposed by law at this stage? 
Furthermore, should, for instance, an ISP conduct his own evaluation 
about how the application of privacy nudges on his website may reduce 
risks for privacy, impacting on users' behaviour and should he decide 
which nudge is more appropriate? Economic considerations may bring 
him to choose the less appropriate nudge; although a very informal, 
youngish interface may be of negative effect on users' protective 
behaviour, it might increase trust in his website and, consequently, 
increase personal data disclosure (necessary for its business model). 211 
A DP assessment, if any, might be made at a higher level, e.g., by 
the EDPS, the European DP Supervisor, or by the national Data 
Protection Authorities and for categories of data controllers ( e.g., ISPs ). 
In this case, visceral notices or other kinds of privacy nudges may 
represent valuable options that add to a wider framework of requirements 
aimed at obtaining a sort of data protection certification, like privacy 
seals,212 which are encouraged by the Draft GDPR (Article 39). 
209. See Luzak, supra note 83, at 549. See also Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13563 
(2011), which promotes increased public participation throughout all stages of the rulemaking 
process and encourages public agencies to consider regulatory approaches such as default 
rules, disclosure, and simplification that nudge citizens toward better choices while allowing 
them to retain flexibility and liberty of choice. 
210. Artemi R. Lombarte, The Madrid Resolution and Prospects for Transnational 
PIAs, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 385,395 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2012). 
211. For a critical perspective on privacy nudges see Willis, supra note 144, at 1170-72. 
"Nudges may not be an effective way to help people make better choices about information 
privacy; accordingly, firms can use the same mechanisms and conditions that make nudges 
work to make nudges fail." Id. 
212. Final Report of the European Union Privacy Seals Project on the Inventory and 
47
Monteleone: Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent
Published by SURFACE, 2015
116 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 43:1 
Finally, behavioural insights could be introduced to evaluate ex post 
the goodness of a law (or piece oflaw) to improve people's privacy life: 
learn from the experience (how people reacted to a specific public 
intervention in the privacy field) and take the consequent policy 
decisions. 
Having said that, a word of caution is required. While it would be 
naive to ignore the effect of biases when setting a privacy policy that 
relies on the decisions of people, we should, however, not totally rely on 
the effects of biases. First, privacy choices are context-dependent. 
Therefore, EU future strategies should consider and possibly guide the 
choice of what privacy nudge is better for a specific context ( e.g., 
informal, youngish context). 
Secondly, as recent behavioural research in the law domain also 
teach us, implementing nudging mechanisms might not be enough to 
protect online privacy, especially in contexts such as behavioural 
targeting by companies: we cannot easily rely on user's behaviour change 
when personal data disclosure is the only way to obtaining a service: in 
cases such as news programing or webpages targeting kids, 213 
prohibitions and a duly control system of certain companies practices are 
needed.214 Recent studies have shown that many companies might not 
obey what they promise in their privacy policies or that they do not 
respect the users' preference, for instance, not to receive unsolicited 
commercial emails. 215 Therefore, there will be always some aspects that 
needs coercive regulatory tools. 
In other words, privacy visceral notices might not be considered as 
a panacea to protect privacy, but complementary tools. Sometimes, 
coercive measures are still necessary: ( 1) when personal data is necessary 
to obtain a public service; (2) in general, technical processes and 
mechanisms specific ofbig data216 make users unaware of what decisions 
Analysis of Certification Schemes , at 12 (2013), available at 
http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Dehert/481.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
213. See Simone van der Hof, No Child's Play: Online Data Protection for Our 
Children, in MINDING MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY 
127, 130 (Simone van der Hof et al. eds., 2014). 
214. Borgesius, supra note 80, at 5, 46. 
215. Some tests with unsolicited commercial emails ("UCE") show that only one out of 
three websites respect the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. 
See Maurizio Borghi et al., Online Data Processing Consent Under EU Law: A Theoretical 
Framework and Empirical Evidence From The UK, 21 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 109, 152 
(2013) (reporting that their study, conducted on popular UK-based websites, "unveils that the 
way in which websites obtain consent (opt-in, pre-selected opt-in, or opt-out) is not a proxy 
of lawful processing of data at a later stage"). 
216. Cukier & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 81 , at 6. 
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will be taken on the basis of their data; and (3) online companies might 
not be compliant with their policies. Even if they advertise their website 
as privacy-protective, thus increasing users' trust, their promises to 
respect users' privacy preferences might be infringed, without users being 
able to realize it. Privacy seals might prove to be an instrument for 
competition among companies that, however, centers on privacy image 
rather than privacy reality.217 Moreover, online companies may use the 
same mechanisms that make nudges work to make nudges fail, like 
reframing the nudges: "a push [back] can easily overwhelm a nudge."218 
Therefore, in order to make sure that tested privacy nudges work as 
expected also in real life, public policy should learn the lessons of 
behavioural science, being capable to guide and check not only the 
creation ( design) but also the use of these nudges; it may be necessary to 
impose requirements and conditions, not only on the appearance of a 
privacy nudge, but on the effects it pursues. Also, for privacy seals to 
work and given the difficulty for users to distinguish websites on privacy 
grounds, it would be necessary to increase the driving and supervisory 
powers of data protection authorities, which can verify the truthfulness of 
privacy seals ( or other certification model) and strengthen their effect. 
1. Future research 
Online companies may be non-compliant with data protection law 
for different reasons, including the lack of appropriate standard of 
information on what the law requires, as well as a lack adequate 
supervision mechanisms.219 On this regard, future research may explore 
possibilities for nudging systems to target the companies themselves, i.e., 
to drive them to be compliant with data protection law. 
For future research, cyber-security risks (besides and in addition to 
those for privacy and data protection) should also be considered. 
Accidental or intentional personal data breaches ( e.g., as consequence of, 
but not limited to, hacking activity), as well as identity thefts (perpetrated, 
for instance to commit financial crimes) are still far from being defeated. 
However, the security in cyberspace may be benefited and improved 
217. Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 64,128 
(2014). 
218. Id. at 131. 
219. Borghi et al. , supra note 215, at 110, 153 (claiming that there is a severe lack of 
compliance of UK on line service providers with essential requirements of data protection law 
and suggest that this might due to the existence of "an inappropriate standard of 
implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, rather than of a conscious 
infringing behavior." As they notice, "unclear or unexplained law is detrimental to the 
development of a safe online environment and, ultimately, to citizens"). 
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precisely through nudging systems, 220 including the use of privacy and 
security nudges. These might take the form of visceral notices, as 
described in this text, or of other kinds of nudging mechanisms. 221 
Further research should also investigate the long-term impact of visceral 
notices and privacy nudges in general and observe users' privacy 
behaviours over time.222 
V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The behaviourally-informed approach to regulatory problems, in 
fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments, so called nudges, are 
becoming authentic policy tools. To what extent behavioural insights can 
be applied to policy-making in the field of privacy and how? Building 
upon few existing experiments on users' attitudes and behaviour as 
regards privacy, this paper aims at bringing behavioural research methods 
for privacy to the attention of policymakers, exploring challenges and 
opportunities of applying behavioural insights into privacy policy-
making, at its different stages: from the design to the implementation 
phase. 
After having discussed the reasons of the failure of traditional 
information notices (privacy policies) and considered the benefits of 
applying behavioural insights for regulatory purposes in general ( e.g., 
nudging strategies), this article claims that the introduction of privacy 
nudges, as complementary regulatory tools can be considered legitimate 
and worthy of policy support, also in Europe, as far as: ( 1) they seek at 
encouraging a privacy-enhancing behaviour, while preserving the 
freedom of choice of the users (rather than hinder it), as soft or libertarian 
paternalism claims;223 and (2) they are adopted in a transparent manner 
and subject to oversight mechanisms to guarantee that base legal 
principles are respected. 
Also, the paper aims to trigger the discussion on the feasibility of 
introducing specific legal requirements for effective privacy notices 
(whether on a privacy-by-design architecture or also on the purposes to 
be pursued, i.e., the behavioural change). 
After all, the new Proposal for a European GDPR, 224 seeks to 
reinforce the transparency and informed consent requirements in view of 
220. See Work Packages, SPION (Dec. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.spion.me/workpackages/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
221. van der Berg, supra note 108, at 776, 783. 
222. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 4, 28. 
223. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5. 
224. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2. 
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strengthening individual rights. Behavioural insights and nudging 
systems ( as visceral notices) may represent an evolving way of 
interpreting and implementing the new Regulation, or a way of testing 
the adequacy of its stated safeguards. 
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